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SANDY HOOK ADVISORY COMMISSION
DECEMBER 20, 2013
9:50 A.M.

LEGISLATIVE OFFICE BUILDING
HARTFORD, CT

SCOTT JACKSON, Committee Chair
ADRIENNE BENTMAN
RON CHIVINSKI (not present)
ROBERT DUCIBELLA
TERRY EDELSTEIN
KATHLEEN FLAHERTY
ALICE FORRESTER
EZRA GRIFFITH
CHRIS LYDDY
PATRICIA KEANEY-MARUCA
DENIS MCCARTHY
BARBARA O'CONNOR (not present)
WAYNE SANDFORD
HAROLD SCHWARTZ
DAVID SCHONFELD
BERNIE SULLIVAN

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1 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Good morning, everyone. Good
2 to see everyone again. Thank you for coming in for this
3 meeting of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission for
4 December 20th, 2013. We do have two items on the agenda.
5 One is to review the Connecticut Police Chiefs
6 Association report on the Newtown Police response to the
7 Sandy Hook Elementary School shooting, and the other is
8 to re-group after receiving the -- Attorney Sedensky's
9 report on the shooting at that facility and talk about
10 timelines, deliverables and other items, questions or
11 issues that arise from our review of that report.

12 So why don't we introduce ourselves starting
13 from my left.

14 DR. BENTMAN: My name is Adrienne Bentman, I'm
15 a psychiatrist and the program director for the Institute
16 of Living Adult General Psychiatry Residency Program.

17 MR. SULLIVAN: Bernie Sullivan, Former Chief of
18 Police, City of Hartford, Commission of Public Safety,
19 State of Connecticut.

20 MS. KEAVNEY-MARUCA: Patricia Keavney-Maruca,
21 retired special education teacher and member of the
22 Connecticut State Board of Education.

23 MR. SANDFORD: Wayne Sanford, Professor,
24 University of New Haven in fire, science and emergency
25 management.

1 MS. EDELSTEIN: I'm Terry Edelstein, Governor
2 Malloy's non-profit liaison.

3 CHAIRPERSON JACKSON: Scott Jackson, Mayor,
4 Town of Hamden.

5 DR. FORRESTER: Alice Forrester, executive
6 director, Clifford Beers Clinic, New Haven, Connecticut.

7 MR. DUCIBELLA: Bob Ducibella, founding and
8 senior principal, Ducibella, Hunter and Santora, security
9 consulting engineers.

10 DR. SCHWARTZ: Hank Schwartz, psychiatrist in
11 chief at Hartford Hospital's Institute of Living.

12 MR. LIDDY: Good morning. Christopher Liddy,
13 former state representative for Newtown and a licensed
14 clinical social worker here in Connecticut Advanced
15 Trauma Solutions.

16 MR. GRIFFITH: Ezra Griffith, member of the
17 Department of Psychiatry at the Yale School of Medicine.

18 DR. SCHONFELD: David Schonfeld, developmental
19 and behavioral pediatrician and director of the National
20 Center for School Crisis and Bereavement.

21 MS. FLAHERTY: Kathy Flaherty, a staff attorney
22 at Statewide Legal Services and a mental health advocate.

23 MR. MCCARTHY: Good morning. Denis McCarthy,
24 fire chief and emergency management director for the City
25 of Norwalk.

1 CHAIRPERSON JACKSON: Thank you. Chiefs, as
2 you are acutely aware, since the shooting at Sandy Hook
3 Elementary School, there have been nearly two dozen other
4 shootings in school environments. The manner and fashion
5 of response is critical. Obviously it's been well
6 documented that post Columbine the style of response to
7 these endeavors changed dramatically and changed
8 universally. One of the questions before us now is
9 whether or not those standards and training standards are
10 still adequate for today.

11 So we would love to hear your thoughts on -- or
12 your analysis of what happened 12/14/12 at Newtown from a
13 law enforcement response and what, if any, changes you
14 would make to standard protocols. Chief Montminy and
15 Chief Reed, the floor is yours.

16 POLICE CHIEF REED: Good morning, Mayor Jackson
17 and distinguished members of the commission. My name is
18 Matthew Reed and I am the chief of police for the South
19 Windsor Police Department. With me today is Chief Marc
20 Montminy of the Manchester Police Department. We are
21 here today representing the Connecticut Police Chiefs
22 Association. CPCA is a professional organization that
23 represents the interests of Connecticut's full-time
24 police chiefs.

25 Chief Jack Daly of the Southington Police

1 Department is the current president of the Connecticut
2 Police Chiefs Association and in August of this year
3 Chief Daly was asked by Newtown's police chief, Michael
4 Kehoe, to initiate a peer review of the Newtown Police
5 Department's emergency response to the Sandy Hook school
6 incident that occurred on December 14th, 2012. Chief
7 Daly appointed us, along with Chief Michael Crowley of
8 the Groton Police Department, and Chief Michael Maniago
9 of the Torrington Police Department to conduct a review
10 of the Newtown Police Department's initial response to
11 the Sandy Hook school. We are all from departments
12 outside of Fairfield County and we all have no
13 significant connection to Chief Kehoe or his agency.

14 As the events of that tragic day unfolded and
15 in the days and weeks that followed, a number of media
16 organizations published reports questioning the response
17 time of Newtown's first responders. At least one news
18 organization published an erroneous report that it took
19 police 20 minutes to arrive at the school. Chief Kehoe
20 knowing this information to be highly inaccurate sought our
21 review in an effort to formally memorialize the response
22 posture of the Newtown police officers that morning.

23 The scope of our investigation was limited to a
24 review of the earliest moments of that event. The first
25 emergency telephone calls, the first radio dispatches and

1 the records of the first arrival of police personnel.

2 We were provided access to available data that
3 would assist us in the conduct of our review. Such data
4 included 911 audio recordings, radio transmission
5 recordings, in car audio and video recordings, and
6 written statements of responding officers, along with
7 other pertinent records of the Newtown Police Department.
8 The response review subcommittee was also granted access
9 to the Sandy Hook school and the surrounding property in
10 the weeks prior to the facility's demolition.

11 The results of our review were published in a
12 report that was released on December 5th, 2013. I expect
13 that you have a copy of that report and I will provide
14 you now with a brief overview of our findings.

15 The first 911 call received at the Newtown
16 emergency communication center came in at 9:35 and 39
17 seconds. As one dispatcher listened to the caller,
18 information was immediately broadcast over the Newtown
19 police frequency notifying officers of the event. Our
20 review of in car video and radio frequency recordings
21 showed that all of the patrol units on patrol duty began
22 responding to the Sandy Hook school without delay. In
23 one very telling video, a police officer in the midst of
24 a traffic stop with a motorist is seen standing next to
25 the motorist's vehicle talking to the driver through the

1 driver's window. The voice of the dispatcher can be
2 heard on the officer's radio speaker, and without any
3 hesitation, the officer abruptly returns the operator's
4 driver's license to the driver through the driver's
5 window and moves briskly back to his patrol car. He
6 activates his emergency lights and siren and begins his
7 immediate response to the school.

8 It is our conclusion that there was no delay in
9 the acknowledgment and response of the Newtown police
10 officers assigned to patrol duty that day. As officers
11 responded, the supervisor can be heard on the radio
12 directing the responding officers. For us, conducting
13 the review, this was a key action that indicated that
14 responding Newtown officers and supervisor were keenly
15 aware of the seriousness of this report and were
16 responding aggressively and preparing to arrive with the
17 best tactical advantage possible.

18 It is important to keep their response in
19 perspective. That is to understand that the officers
20 responding and arriving at the scene in those first few
21 minutes did not have the benefit of knowing what we all
22 know today. They did not know what exactly was going on
23 inside that building. There were no 911 calls indicating
24 that children had been shot or were being targeted. The
25 only report of injury that was received prior to their

1 arrival was the report of a teacher who had been shot in
2 the foot but was otherwise okay.

3 Records indicate that the first officer arrived
4 at the school two minutes and 41 seconds after the
5 initial dispatch. Twenty seconds later at least two
6 additional Newtown officers arrived at the scene, and 57
7 seconds later, two more officers arrived.

8 As officers arrived, there was a report of gun
9 shots coming from the front of the building, possibly
10 from the roof at the front of the building. At the same
11 time officers at the rear of the building and at the
12 front of the building see a person moving along the
13 outside wall of the school on the side nearest the
14 playground. Officers move quickly to confront, contain
15 and identify this person. As officers are confronting
16 the man who was later identified as a parent, other
17 officers are arriving on the scene. Some officers begin
18 to move around the rear of the school in search of our
19 suspects and in search of a point of entry. One group of
20 officers gets to the boiler room where they find an open
21 door and make entry into the school, and at about the
22 same time another team of officers makes entry into the
23 school on the side nearest the playground, not far from
24 where the unknown person was initially confronted.

25 Entry into the school is confirmed at 9:44:50.

1 This is five minutes and 57 seconds after the first
2 officer arrived on the scene. The shooter is reported
3 down at 9:51:31. A review of audio recordings from
4 various sources indicates the shooter may have fired
5 multiple shots during a period of approximately 70
6 seconds after the first officer arrived on the scene.

7 In our report we discuss the responsive law
8 officers to incidents such as this. That is the tactical
9 considerations of responding officers. And while entry
10 into the building to stop the shooting is the primary
11 object in the response to an active shooter event,
12 officers must remain fully aware of their environment.

13 When the Newtown officers arrived on the scene
14 they parked in positions that would allow them quick
15 access to the building but also the best view of the
16 building and the surrounding area. Their attention was
17 immediately drawn to a person moving along the outside of
18 the building and they focused on stopping this person.
19 At the same time dispatch radio that they received a
20 report from a teacher inside the building that two
21 figures could be seen running along the outside of the
22 school towards the rear of the school. Officers
23 initially focused on this threat. They located a man
24 outside of the building and they detained him. Officers
25 then made entry into the building from two points.

1 Again, that total elapsed time from officer arrival to
2 building entry was five minutes and 57 seconds.

3 Our review reveals that the Newtown patrol
4 officers dispatched to the school responded immediately
5 and arrived in less than three minutes. This is an ideal
6 response time for the highest priority call.

7 To put this in perspective, there are a number
8 of priority one response time goals that are used by law
9 enforcement across the country. And those goals for the
10 most series of police calls range anywhere from three
11 minutes to eight minutes. So we want to make sure we
12 note that the two minute and 41 second response time by
13 the Newtown officers is well within any known published
14 priority one emergency response time goal for a law
15 enforcement agency.

16 The single issue that will continue to be
17 scrutinized will be the time the officers spent outside
18 the building. There is nothing that we can do to
19 alleviate this scrutiny other than to say the officers
20 were engaged in the assessment of what they perceived as
21 a true threat, they dealt with that threat quickly and
22 then moved into the building.

23 It is our opinion that the Newtown police first
24 responders responded rapidly and deployed their resources
25 appropriately and in accordance with law enforcement's

1 best practices. It is our belief that the immediate
2 arrival of police was recognized by the shooter and
3 ultimately hastened the shooter's decision to take his
4 own life.

5 We thank you for this opportunity to present
6 our report to you and we will now answer any questions
7 that this commission has.

8 CHAIRPERSON JACKSON: Thank you. Chief
9 Montminy, anything you would like to add?

10 CHIEF MONTMINY: I just want to add a brief
11 couple comments about active shooter philosophy. The
12 1999 Columbine shooting exposed law enforcement's tactic
13 of surround and wait for SWAT to be insufficient and
14 after 1999 law enforcement agencies across the country
15 started to change their training philosophy. The new
16 philosophy is immediate contact as quick as possible, as
17 soon as you can get together a team to make an entry, you
18 make an entry. You avoid all other distractions with the
19 single goal of confronting the shooter.

20 The reason being is that the research is clear,
21 the quicker the confrontation, the better. Shooters kill
22 one person every 15 seconds during a typical spree and
23 then typically the shooter commits suicide when
24 confronted. So the quicker the confrontation, the
25 better. Pre-Columbine, law enforcement was taught to

1 surround the facility and wait for SWAT. Post-Columbine,
2 we don't want to wait -- we no longer wait, we go in and
3 we try to move toward the shooter as quickly as possible
4 with the goal of forcing the shooter to make a decision.
5 The shooter can either retreat, the shooter can engage
6 the police, or kill himself. Any of those three options
7 are better than allowing the shooter to continue to
8 shoot.

9 So this is the state of training that we teach
10 officers in Connecticut and mostly across the country.
11 This is the standard by which law enforcement is taught.
12 Thank you.

13 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Thank you. Questions from
14 the commission?

15 MR. LIDDY: Good morning. Thank you for your
16 service to your respective communities and to Newtown by
17 doing this report. In your review, first of all, I want
18 to publicly state that the response time for Newtown
19 police is absolutely phenomenal. Really thank you for
20 highlighting that to us.

21 In your review, did you come across any
22 barriers to the response?

23 CHIEF REED: We saw no barriers. We saw that
24 the coordination in the emergency communication center --
25 and I think it's important to note that the emergency

1 communication center in Newtown, what we know as the
2 PSAP, Public Safety Answering Point, is not the police
3 department, it is a separate entity. The work that they
4 did, that you can hear on the audio recordings is
5 remarkable. The composure of the dispatchers and their
6 ability to deal with an incredible amount of information
7 and get that information through the radio to the
8 officers responding was remarkable. So we didn't see any
9 barriers there.

10 The radios worked as they were supposed to
11 work. Again, we highlighted in today's comments the
12 video we watched of the officer who was quite some
13 distance away on a traffic stop, and it's difficult to do
14 many things at once; and this officer was on a traffic
15 stop, engaged in a conversation with a motorist regarding
16 a motor vehicle violation, had the operator's license in
17 hand, probably going through the motions in preparation
18 of citing the motorist and heard the transmission on his
19 external microphone, which serves also as a speaker --
20 you don't always catch those transmissions when you're
21 engaged in a conversation -- but caught the fact that
22 there was a report of a shooting occurring at the Sandy
23 Hook Elementary School and there was no hesitation.
24 There was no thought that oh, another one of these types
25 of calls again. I mean it was very clear there was no

1 question in his mind that he needed to get from where he
2 was to that school immediately. And that's when he put
3 the license back through the window, returned to his
4 cruiser rapidly and the response was remarkable. That he
5 got there as quick as he did without anything else
6 happening between that location and the location of the
7 school.

8 So communication, my point in bringing that up
9 is oftentimes we see issues with communication in the
10 radio system. The radios worked as they were supposed to
11 work and the information got out there to all the
12 officers that were available to respond. And all the
13 audio recordings indicated they responded immediately.

14 Were there some limitations at the facility as
15 far as layout? One access driveway in, one access
16 driveway out, as we've seen from the videos and a larger
17 scope review of this incident would certainly show how
18 that one pathway in and out become clogged very rapidly
19 because of all the responders. There was nowhere else
20 for them to put their vehicles. So that becomes a
21 challenge.

22 But it appears as though, everything we can
23 gather, they had sound policy, they had sound training,
24 they had drilled on that training. And as I pointed out
25 in my comments today, when you start to hear a supervisor

1 giving pre-arrival instructions to the units while
2 they're on their way, that's a big indicator that
3 tactically this is an agency that knows what they're
4 doing and they are preparing for --
5 obviously nobody could imagine what the scope of the
6 event was, but they were preparing to surround that
7 building and make an entry in the best way that they
8 could based on the information that they knew. So we
9 were not able to identify any specific challenges or
10 hurdles that they had to overcome in that immediate
11 response.

12 MR. LIDDY: Thank you. So I heard just one
13 thing that was a challenge, and that's the one entry in
14 and one entry out. But that didn't impact the response
15 time in any way?

16 CHIEF REED: It didn't. Because those initial
17 units, one came to the back, Crestview Drive. There were
18 units on the back that were directed to go there and
19 that's very, very close proximity to the building itself
20 and other units came up in the front. So those initial
21 units had no trouble getting to the school and
22 positioning themselves in a tactically sound location so
23 they could make entry to the school. And it's very
24 important that they see the outside of the school.

25 And I know that there has been criticism why

1 didn't they go right to the front door and go in the
2 front door. And that's easy to say now knowing what we
3 know, but they didn't know all of that information when
4 they responded. So we see their response and their
5 positioning as being wholly appropriate.

6 MR. LIDDY: Thank you very much.

7 CHIEF MONTMINY: If I can add briefly, one of
8 the things I noted in the review was that officers had
9 local knowledge, that even though there was a road that
10 traveled very close to the rear of the school, it wasn't
11 really an entrance so to speak. And they received
12 pre-arrival instructions to send some officers to the
13 front and some to the back. And the first arriving unit
14 actually arrived in the back, which no one would have
15 known about had they not had local knowledge. So they
16 were aware that this road traveled very close to the rear
17 of the school and it was probably the closest point of
18 access and the first officers who arrived actually took
19 that route.

20 MR. LIDDY: Wonderful, thank you for
21 highlighting that. Thank you.

22 DR. BENTMAN: So one of the difficulties I have
23 personally in asking these questions, is that I realize
24 the officers who responded were confronted with something
25 that I don't suspect that when they signed up to become

1 police officers that they thought that they would ever
2 have to see and that they may be suffering today still
3 for the consequence of that. And so it makes those of us
4 who are asked to scrutinize their work, it makes us -- it
5 puts us in a difficult position. And I'm in the same
6 position in relation to you guys.

7 So my question really has to do with when each
8 of these events occur, they offer sort of different
9 scenarios. So this -- I mean you would describe it
10 differently, my version of it is this is a, um, middle or
11 upper middle class sleepy small town in suburbia with a
12 police force of X size and they're confronted with a
13 shooting in a school and some degree of chaos outside the
14 school. And conflicting bits of information about where
15 the shots are being fired from.

16 So what advice do you have for the rest of the
17 country's school systems that are similar to this that
18 you've learned that would provide them perhaps a
19 different set of guideposts or additional guideposts when
20 confronting this situation?

21 CHIEF MONTMINY: I guess I would start by saying
22 that no one has gone through this enough times to develop
23 expertise. That's the reality of it. And your comment
24 about officers not expecting what happened at Sandy Hook,
25 that's right, no one expects that that's going to happen

1 in their community. But if history has taught us
2 anything, it's taught us that it can happen anywhere.
3 And so one of the lessons I think we can take away from
4 this, is that communities need to work together and that
5 eliminates the problem of the small sleepy town and the
6 big city. If everybody works together and trains
7 together, training together is key. Because when an
8 incident of this size happens, everybody's coming,
9 whether it be your neighboring towns or the state police,
10 whoever, they are all going to be on scene. It's
11 important for everyone to have the same level of
12 training. Everyone should know what's expected of them
13 regardless whether they come from a twelve man department
14 or a 250 man department, they should all have the same
15 level of training.

16 But you can drill and you can train for this
17 kind of thing, but who ever expected that this was going
18 to happen in Newtown, Connecticut.

19 CHIEF REED: The circumstances and the incidents
20 that can be recalled, if you were to set forth a document
21 that had all of the school shootings that have occurred
22 in the last decade, no two circumstances are the same.
23 For example, we train our officers to try to get into the
24 facility in a group of three or four officers.
25 Apparently the shift is now moving towards a single or

1 dual officer entry so that you can get in there as quick
2 as possible. But then all of a sudden we have the
3 situation where they are confronting perceived threats on
4 the outside of the building and now it starts to throw
5 your response into a different direction, something that
6 may or may not have been practiced in training.

7 So I think for each one of these events we take
8 some information away to aide in future training and
9 future responses. But I think one of the basic elements
10 that's very important is the fostering of communication
11 between boards of education, school departments and
12 police departments.

13 I'm from a community where fortunately for many
14 years we have had a dialogue and we have worked together
15 on security initiatives, safe school initiatives and
16 there are many communities that have done that also. But
17 we found after this event that there were a number of
18 communities who had not worked hand in hand with their
19 police departments, they had not hardened their building,
20 they had not limited access. And I think one of the
21 things that has come from this and some of the funding
22 that's been made available is that there has been an
23 increased awareness of the importance of hardening the
24 target. But at the same time we don't want to bring our
25 children to a fortress every day because we want them to

1 enjoy openness and the ability to move about freely, but
2 safely.

3 But I think another thing that has come out of
4 this is the importance of the communication between
5 boards of education and police. And through the years we
6 have seen this fostered in some communities and in other
7 communities it just doesn't happen.

8 But I think that's a basic level item, that if
9 I had to give a piece of advice to agencies across
10 America would be you need to know who your school
11 department staff members are. They need to know who the
12 police are. They need to understand that in the event of
13 a crisis you're there to help them and the school needs
14 to have policies and practices that will allow the police
15 to know who the good guys are when they show up at the
16 scene and able be to more readily identify who the bad
17 guys are. In other words, do they have an identifying
18 system? Does every teacher or staff member wear an ID
19 card? Do students have identification cards so in the
20 event of a critical incident when officers show up at the
21 school, do they know a faculty member from a student? I
22 don't know about -- I would imagine your town is no
23 different than mine, you walk into the high school and
24 sometimes it's hard to tell who the teachers are and who
25 the students are. Even the middle school can be that way

1 sometimes.

2 So it's -- you know we encourage this not just
3 at school -- elementary school, high school, middle
4 school, but also when you get into institutions of higher
5 learning. You get into a community college campus
6 setting or into a university setting, I don't know of any
7 of our institutions of higher learning where faculty
8 wears readily accessible or identifiable cards so that
9 you know who the staff members are, the people who are
10 supposed to be there as opposed to the people that aren't
11 supposed to be there. So those are some of the basic
12 elements that we try to advise in our writings, in our
13 talks to organizations is communication is incredibly
14 important in working together towards that goal of safe
15 and secure learning facilities.

16 MR. DUCIBELLA: Thank you for being here today.
17 And I also appreciate the detail that was in the report
18 that you put together. From an engineering perspective,
19 we always learn things from bridges that fail, buildings
20 that fail. And what my interest is on behalf of the
21 commission is asking a couple questions about what did we
22 learn from this that we could apply, as others in the
23 commission have asked.

24 It's clear from the report, but I'd love for
25 you to confirm it, that had we been able to keep the

1 shooter out of the building a little longer, it would
2 have helped them. I know he used this semiautomatic
3 rifle to very quickly compromise a glazing on the outside
4 of the building that allowed him to enter very, very
5 quickly. Those minutes would have been helpful. I know
6 that some of the recommendations the committee is making
7 to the Safe School Infrastructure Committee is to in very
8 limited locations change glazing -- and not necessarily
9 ballistic glazing, there are other kinds of glass that
10 are not very expensive that would have kept that
11 individual out of the school. In light of the timeline
12 you produced, I think we would all agree, and I'm just
13 looking for confirmation that had we bought a couple
14 minutes there, things would have perhaps been a lot
15 better. Especially with these officers arriving under
16 three minutes, A.

17 B, the sort of buzz word today is situational
18 awareness. And it seems that had the officers when they
19 arrived had the benefit of some video surveillance that
20 was available as part of an on call, on return to the
21 scene, in car laptop arrangement. This is not a
22 criticism what the officers didn't have or didn't use,
23 but if they were able to arrive with a floor plan of the
24 school, a site plan of the school in their vehicles. And
25 if they had the benefit of some live video and -- you

1 know, we have a lot of people out there who have video
2 looking at their yachts in Martha's Vineyard which to me
3 are not nearly as important as little kids in a school.
4 Is it your opinion that buying some additional time by
5 specifying some better glazing and providing situational
6 awareness through a drawing of a school site and floor
7 plan and having some pre-arrival knowledge of what it was
8 that happened at the scene. Because a lot of the
9 controversy is -- and it's terrible to go back and try to
10 quarter back this stuff later -- individuals were outside
11 the building and officers were making an attempt to find
12 individuals who could have been involved in a crime.
13 Having some pre-arrival video, having some better glazing
14 and having a quality understanding of the floor plan,
15 would that, in your opinion, have evaded this situation?

16 CHIEF REED: It's difficult to say if it would
17 have improved their response time. As chiefs we struggle
18 with the distractions that our officers have inside the
19 cruisers. They all have cell phones; mobile devices; in
20 car cameras; they have in car mobile data terminals; and
21 we have contemplated that idea and I know there are
22 communities who have floor plans that are available in
23 their vehicles. There are some who have video being
24 pumped directly from the school either to their dispatch
25 center or patrol cars, in some situations both.

1 All -- I think expensive technology, some
2 schools may feel comfortable opening up that information
3 for access by organizations outside the school, and some
4 may not be comfortable with that. But I also cringe a
5 bit at the idea of an officer pulling up and then turning
6 to his computer screen and looking for some detail when
7 perhaps the better course of action is for the officer to
8 be out the door and heading -- out of the cruiser and
9 heading towards the facility. So you can see where
10 there's a bit of struggle there.

11 And of course as they're driving -- if you see
12 the video -- I mean they drove very well to get where
13 they were going, but that's because they were focused 100
14 percent, both hands on the wheel, looking down, also
15 trying to control your lights and siren, get to where you
16 need to be. You can imagine the impossibility of trying
17 to take more data in, especially altering your attention
18 to a computer screen. So those are challenges. But we
19 encourage that, we are working on that in our community
20 and I know there are a number of communities that are
21 working on having that video pumped somewhere so somebody
22 can give you some pre-arrival detail.

23 When I listen to what was going on in the
24 communication center, I don't know that there they would
25 have been able to add that to their list of tasks they

1 were doing. Because as we look at an event like this, we
2 say boy, it would have been are great if they had two
3 more people in there. But the problem is you pick the
4 date and time they need those two more people in there.
5 So we all know that means you think there should be two
6 more dispatchers in there -- that's an arbitrary number
7 I'm throwing out there -- is there an appetite to fund
8 those two positions 24 hours a day, 365 days a year. In
9 many cases the answer to that is no.

10 So yes, video is good; yes, floor plans are
11 good. I think it comes back to the idea of
12 communication. Departments communicating with their
13 Boards of Education and the schools and hopefully having
14 those plans already accessible to them whether in
15 electronic format or whether they are in paper format,
16 and they have an emergency folder in their cruiser they
17 can take out, it has all the school floor plans and then
18 refer to it at the point that it's necessary. In a
19 situation like this, you wouldn't actually be going to
20 floor plans until you had teams in there beginning to go
21 door to door and you were able to mark off what places
22 you had been to and what places you had not.

23 And part of it is also encouraging police
24 officers to stop by all of the schools on a daily basis,
25 or at least frequently enough so they can walk around the

1 school, inside and out, and be familiar with all of the
2 little ins and outs that some of these facilities have so
3 they have an idea of where some of these hiding spaces
4 are, where the areas of refuge are, what the layout of
5 the school is on the inside.

6 I'm from a community where fortunately we have
7 time to do that, but there are not -- there are
8 communities that are bigger, much busier and their
9 officers just don't have the time to go do that. So
10 somebody has to make a point to again increase that
11 communication and familiarity with the layout of each of
12 the schools.

13 To go to your crime prevention comment about
14 the target being hardened. This is one of the things
15 that we encourage when we do crime prevention through
16 environmental design or any of our crime prevention
17 presentations is harden the target. It's a very basic
18 crime prevention concept.

19 Deny, deter, detect and delay, the four Ds of
20 crime prevention. Deny, deter, detect and delay. If you
21 can slow their entry -- It's said in the world of
22 burglary prevention if you can delay their entry by three
23 minutes, the bad guy will go to another location.
24 Whether that means windows that are locked, doors that
25 are locked, garage that is locked, an alarm that sounds,

1 they will go somewhere else.

2 So if you take that philosophy and lay it on to
3 school security, perhaps if there's a way to delay the
4 entry long enough the person will go somewhere else.

5 But the disclaimer that I think every police
6 officer probably gives when they do a crime prevention
7 presentation is, if somebody wants what you got, they
8 will figure out a way to do it and they will get it.
9 Whether that means TV, whether that means money, whether
10 that means jewelry, if they want to get it, they are
11 going to figure out a way to get in there quick enough,
12 get to the location where it is and get out. And sadly,
13 if you have somebody who is hell bent on going in and
14 engaging in this type of atrocious conduct, they're going
15 to find out a way to do. And I don't know how you
16 prevent against that.

17 MR. DUCIBELLA: I really appreciate the
18 insight, because there's obviously a lot of scrutiny
19 going into what were people doing on the way there,
20 counting every second. And adding technology in a
21 vehicle to an officer who's already doing lights and
22 bars, and making an attempt not to create another problem
23 on the way to the scene also trying to study technology
24 information. There's a lot of discussion and it wasn't a
25 trick question, but I was anxious to hear what the actual

1 responders would feel about adding more information when
2 already what they are trying to do is get to a place as
3 quickly as possible. Thank you very much.

4 DR. SCHONFELD: I wanted to start by echoing
5 the sentiment that I appreciate some of the sensitivities
6 of even asking the questions as we critically review
7 this, and I think you did an exceptional job of reviewing
8 something carefully and I agree with the conclusions.
9 Also I find after there's any tragic event, people try to
10 undo the event by studying it in enormous detail to try
11 to figure out what they could have done, even if
12 sometimes doing the best you can isn't good enough to
13 prevent it; because that is just the reality.

14 So -- I also understand that people are asking
15 specific questions and restricting their analysis to the
16 question at hand. So with all of that, which is a lot of
17 kind of statements to preface this, I have a question
18 because I kind of noted that when we're talking about why
19 this event happened, there wasn't any comment made by the
20 fact that within three minutes the officers arriving were
21 able to identify an unmonitored and unlocked door and
22 enter the building. So why while we're focusing all of
23 our attention on trying to prevent getting into the door
24 that the shooter went in, there also were other
25 opportunities that the shooter could have entered

1 unobserved through another door of that building that
2 just -- Was it just not locked? And again I'm not trying
3 to imply in any way that someone made a failure, and
4 obviously it didn't contribute to what happened in this
5 event, but we're trying to get general learnings out of
6 this to help in other school settings.

7 So I'm wondering if -- I just noted that wasn't
8 commented. Maybe I misheard. But that would seem like
9 that's a fairly simple intervention that other schools
10 could take to lock doors that are not observed.

11 CHIEF REED: Agreed. Our analysis was of the
12 officers' response and not necessarily the posture the --
13 the school security posture of that particular facility.
14 But absolutely, if there was a door that is not locked,
15 and I challenge anyone to walk around any school in any
16 community right now, and although their intentions is to
17 have a single point of entry and make sure all the
18 exterior doors are locked, we have a high school that I
19 think has 27 doors on the outside, and absent some sort
20 of electronic annunciator system that alerts the office
21 that a door is not properly secured, or a camera system
22 that always will see somebody going in and out of the
23 door, it is a challenge to make sure that all doors are
24 locked.

25 In this situation I don't know why it was that

1 that door was not secured when the officers got to it,
2 but it is -- that's a fact that remains, that it was
3 unsecured. Whether that was routine or whether that just
4 happened to be that particular day, whether the janitor
5 had just gone out to the dumpster and just come back, I
6 mean that's all speculation on my part. We can't really
7 say why that door happened to be unlocked.

8 But you're right, are there opportunities for
9 what we call abnormal users, bad guys, criminals, people
10 that you don't want on the premises, are there
11 opportunities every day in schools all around the state
12 for intruders to get in. The answer to that
13 unfortunately may be yes. So I think this comes back to
14 the communication aspect and boards of education, school
15 departments taking ownership of that and making one of
16 their priorities school security and school safety and to
17 have some sort of process so that all doors are checked
18 every single day, maybe on every two hours or however
19 they chose to do it, to monitor doors so that doors
20 remain secure.

21 But I think part of that communication when it
22 comes to crime prevention is important and helps bring
23 that to light and enhance that as a weakness and ensures
24 that schools keep the doors secure.

25 MR. MCCARTHY: Chief Reed, Chief Montminy,

1 thank you for coming and I share the sentiment. I think
2 we all sympathize with the officers who had a life
3 altering event that they will struggle with for the rest
4 of their careers.

5 I would like to look into or have you respond
6 to the 70 seconds that you referred to from the time of
7 arrival to the time that Adam Lanza took his own life.

8 Is there a way -- and us said, Chief, the
9 national average is a life is taken every 15 seconds on
10 average when these events occur. Is there anything that
11 you have found in your analysis that could have changed
12 the continued killing that occurred in that 70 seconds?
13 Was Adam Lanza aware that the police officers were on
14 scene? Was there any knowledge for anyone inside the
15 building that would have indicated that there was
16 awareness that police officers were coming? And could
17 that have changed the outcome only for that 70 seconds?
18 I would be interested in your opinions on that.

19 I have another question, and I'll get it out
20 now. You talk about dispatch and the pre-arrival
21 instructions are so important to both police and fire.
22 And we all struggle with limited staff and I agree
23 there's probably not an appetite for increasing staffing
24 at dispatch centers.

25 Is there an opportunity for mutual aid between

1 dispatch centers from a neighboring community that is not
2 impacted by the emergency that could provide some real
3 support for pre-arrival intelligence for a variety of
4 calls? Could there be support of the dispatch center
5 that's involved in that? Thank you.

6 CHIEF REED: The mutual aid of dispatch centers
7 -- right now we're working through the analysis of
8 deciding if the consolidation of communications is the
9 right thing to do, or not the right thing to do. If one
10 communication center is serving a larger population is
11 more efficient and provides more safety than many small
12 dispatch centers serving smaller populations. And I
13 don't know that there's a final decision on that yet.
14 Because obviously a larger dispatch center servicing a
15 larger population will supposedly have a larger staff.

16 But when a critical incident occurs, of course
17 everything else doesn't stop. So you still have to have
18 people answering the routine calls, answering if you have
19 a regional dispatch center calls coming in from other
20 towns, other officers engaged in police activity that may
21 be far from where the critical incident is occurring.
22 Everything doesn't stop because there's that critical
23 incident. I'm not sure on the question regarding the
24 mutual aid and public safety answering points or dispatch
25 centers helping each other. I think they do, because we

1 have 911 calls that if one gets full, they go over to --
2 they roll over to a nearby answering center. If for some
3 reason your lines go down or you have something going on,
4 a call is made and said listen can you take all of our
5 calls? But of course there's some switching that has to
6 go on there so calls get transferred to another location
7 and that's very technical and I don't know how that would
8 all happen throughout the different phone companies.

9 So I don't know that there's a clear answer as
10 to, other than having increased staffing all the time in
11 that one particular answering point, or communication
12 center, I don't know how -- especially when you look at
13 how quickly this all happened and how quickly the
14 officers responded, I don't know how you would tie
15 another communication center in to that to help in that
16 particular type of situation. So I think that's an
17 unanswered question.

18 To move back to that 70 seconds and what
19 happened in that 70 seconds and what did people know,
20 clearly when the school went into lockdown people are not
21 in a position to watch exactly what's happening outside.
22 And did they come lights and sirens screaming up to the
23 front door? They didn't because they are trained not to
24 do that. When we respond to calls, they usually shut
25 down their equipment earlier than their arrival so that

1 they arrive somewhat quietly so as not to make things
2 worse or to become the target of the aggressor. I know
3 that many can argue whether that's the right way to do it
4 or not. I've certainly seen some writings that say they
5 should go lights and sirens all the way up to the door in
6 order to distract the shooter. Well, in every situation
7 you have no idea if that would have made a difference or
8 not made a difference.

9 People throughout the school, and even officers
10 on the outside of the school in that 70 seconds, there
11 are some phone calls where you can hear some shooting
12 that's occurring. But that's not to say that every
13 officer could hear that shooting and that they all were
14 aware that it was happening. It was only after this
15 analysis of listening to multiple calls did you realize
16 that there was a period of time after first arrival where
17 you could still here some shots being fired.

18 So information was relayed to the officers that
19 there were shots either from the front of the school or
20 up on the roof. But every call the dispatcher is
21 receiving, they don't necessarily know exactly where the
22 caller is and how that relates to where the officers are.

23 My point is not to make excuses, but just to
24 keep in perspective that all of the information that was
25 known in the communication center is not information

1 that's known outside to the officers. And things the
2 officers see, hear and perceive out there are not
3 necessarily transmitted to every single every other
4 officer or to the dispatchers because it's all happening
5 so quickly. So they are taking the information,
6 synthesizing it, deciding what their next move should be.

7 So during those 70 seconds, who knew the police
8 were there and who didn't as far as inside the school? I
9 would say most people in the school -- and perhaps this
10 is the genesis of the 20 minute response time remark --
11 many people in the school may not have known that the
12 police were there and didn't know until they got a knock
13 on their door or a badge put under a closet door that
14 said hey, we're the police, we're here to help, you're
15 safe now. That may have taken many minutes in different
16 parts of the school. So maybe that's the source of the
17 20 minute response time -- or that 20 minute response
18 time comment.

19 Do we know whether the shooter knew police were
20 there? I think the shooter was in a position to know
21 that the police were there. I think an analysis of --
22 although I don't think anybody will ever know exactly the
23 order of events inside those classrooms. But I think the
24 analysis shows that perhaps he was facing in a direction
25 so that he should have known, or would have known that

1 the police were arriving on the scene. And as we cite in
2 our report and in our comments today, we think that
3 probably hastened his decision to take his own life.
4 Sadly there were other lives taken in the moments
5 immediately preceding his own death. But imagine if the
6 officers took 30 seconds more to get there or took
7 another minute to get there, how much more carnage could
8 have occurred. He could have gone across the hall and
9 not seen any police arrival and it could have just
10 continued.

11 Of course all speculation. I have no idea what
12 went on in those classrooms. All we have right now is
13 the evidence that was left.

14 CHIEF MONTMINY: Let me see if I can address
15 the 70 second question. Because what we're talking about
16 is the shooter we believe takes his own life 70 seconds
17 after the first officer arrives. So in order for the
18 officers to have had an impact and interceded prior to
19 that, they would have had to arrive in significant
20 quantities to enter the building, they would have first
21 had to have dealt with the exterior threat that they
22 didn't know wasn't the shooter so that their assumption
23 is they have an exterior threat, they would have gone
24 through this fog of war. If everybody knows what I mean
25 by that, it's a military term. But basically it means

1 your lack of knowing what's actually happening in another
2 part of the building, on the other side of the parking
3 lot. They have to kind of understand that the shooter is
4 in the building, we still have to go get them. They have
5 to then force their way or find an open door and they
6 have to move through the building and confront the
7 shooter within 70 seconds.

8 Actually before that in order to have had an
9 impact they would have had to have done that before that.
10 That's a tall order. I don't know if it's physically
11 possible, to tell you the truth. I know that there were
12 two entry teams that entered the building, one found an
13 open door and the other forced entry. Neither of them
14 would have been able to reach the shooter prior to the
15 expiration of those 70 second when he took his own life.
16 That's my own personal opinion. Think about what would
17 have had to have happened in that roughly minute prior to
18 the shooter taking his own life.

19 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I'm going to let
20 Dr. Schonfeld follow-up, but first I would just like to
21 take a moment to give my thoughts on the PSAPs. We have
22 more PSAPs in the State of Connecticut then there are in
23 California. It's a controversial topic, this notion of
24 consolidation of dispatch, but a small PSAP can easily be
25 overwhelmed and the ability to provide qualified

1 prearrival detail is compromised. I believe when we are
2 in a collaborative environment, much like the police
3 officer who was issuing the citation, hearing what's
4 going on around you provides an opportunity for
5 absorption. So doing this across a single PSAP as
6 opposed to calls rolling over into a place without a
7 level of general detail is a risk. And that's -- As a
8 chief elected official I have been a strong supporter of
9 the consolidation of PSAPs.

10 MR. McCARTHY: If I can just follow-up for a
11 point of clarification. And I'm not suggesting that a
12 police officer were in any way at fault during those 70
13 seconds. My point is that the goal is to encourage the
14 perpetrator to stop the act. And if there's anything
15 that we can learn about the time, from the time he starts
16 to the time he ends that can change his psychology and
17 his willingness to continue the spree, if there is
18 anything that we can learn about that time; and if it is
19 the presence of police officers on scene that might
20 change the direction of the event that we want to
21 explore, what opportunities lay ahead that we can -- and
22 I hope you understand I'm not critical of what happened
23 in those 70 seconds. I just think we want to stop the
24 event as soon as possible and if there is anything we can
25 learn from that. So I thank you.

1 DR. SCHONFELD: The question I have -- I know
2 that a lot of the focus of the report was looking at what
3 happened external to the building and the response, but I
4 also wonder if you can give us any more information about
5 the response within the building?

6 And I'll tell you the reason I'm asking this is
7 often when I'm seeing schools advised on what to do in a
8 lockdown, many schools are instructed or choose to use
9 code words so that the shooter is not aware that they're
10 aware. I've always thought that odd because the one
11 person who clearly knows there's a shooter in the
12 building is the shooter. So it would seem to me that
13 that allows the shooter, if anything, to feel that they
14 are more at liberty to continue shooting. When you're
15 telling me the strategy from a police response is to
16 confront and distract, it would seem that an announcement
17 overhead "there is a shooter in the building, the police
18 will be here in two minutes", or "the police will be here
19 eminently" or something along those lines might
20 accomplish it, but I'm not sure.

21 So the problem is when codes are used, five
22 year olds and six year olds don't know the codes;
23 substitute teachers, people who are coming to help out
24 with gingerbread houses don't know what that means
25 either; and it would seem to me at least it causes more

1 risk by trying to be a little obtuse in how you're giving
2 a warning to the people who need it.

3 So I don't know if you can comment on that. I
4 don't know what was said to put the school into lockdown
5 and whether the people in the school knew that. I trust
6 it had no change in what happened. So I'm not trying to
7 be critical of it, but for learnings for other schools,
8 can you comment on what the recommendation might be?

9 Chief Montminy: Unfortunately we don't have a
10 lot of detail of what took place inside the school. We
11 were provided with the audio tapes, video tapes in the
12 cruiser, the 911, so if it didn't come over the radio, if
13 it wasn't in the officers' statements, and if it wasn't
14 on videotape, we don't know a lot of about what took
15 place inside the building. I think for that you may have
16 to wait for the State Police full investigation because I
17 think they will delve into that matter in great detail.
18 I understand your points and I agree with them, I don't
19 know that we had access to that level of detail.

20 CHIEF REED: We did not.

21 DR. SCHONFELD: Putting that aside, do you have
22 recommendations for other schools? That's what we're
23 trying to come up with here is come up with
24 recommendations for others, not trying to evaluate
25 specifically what happened in that school.

1 CHIEF REED: I know -- You're right, there are
2 many school systems who may use some sort of a code word
3 or code phrase. And we -- I know in my teaching I
4 discourage that, and our system doesn't do it. And I
5 know that there are also systems that use plain speech.
6 We go through this with law enforcement, we go through
7 this with fire fighting where we move away from these
8 codes that communication -- you have to have to have a
9 receiver and you have to have a transmitter and you have
10 to have a shared language, everyone's got to understand
11 it and it doesn't do any good to transfer a message a
12 message if somebody on the other end doesn't know what
13 you're talking about.

14 We found in our schools there were so many
15 transient employees, those that were in one day, out
16 another day. You had a copier person there, you had a
17 substitute teacher, there was no way all these people
18 could know these codes in order to act appropriately in
19 the event of crisis. So it's very clear if the school
20 goes in lockdown, they say the school goes in lockdown
21 and everybody knows what action they are supposed to take
22 when the school goes into lockdown and then they have
23 some modified lockdowns.

24 Remember schools have to prepare for so many
25 different things. You may just have police activity in

1 the area, you may have an actual critical incident in the
2 building, you may have severe weather on the way. There
3 are a number of reasons why a school may go into lockdown
4 mode. So I think for simplicity sake, they try to keep
5 from having one process for bad weather; one process for
6 mechanical failure in the school; one process for an
7 early dismissal; one process for someone comes through
8 the building making threats; one process for someone who
9 is actually seen with a gun. So they try to stick with
10 something that's simple that is going to get the message
11 out there that look, something important is happening,
12 you need to get in your room and lock the door. Those
13 are the things I think that are happening now.

14 Of course we are seeing experts appear from all
15 over who say they have the answer. Whether they all have
16 the same message to the schools of course we don't know
17 that because we don't control who these, quote/unquote,
18 experts are that are coming forward with their
19 philosophies as to how they should handle an incident.
20 But your comments are very well taken.

21 You're absolutely right, the elimination of
22 code words I think is important because, like you say,
23 and that's been my argument many times, the bad guy knows
24 he's a bad guy and that he's in the school, so let's make
25 every effort to let everyone else in the school know that

1 he's there, too, and have them take some sort of action.

2 And I think you're going to see a trend towards
3 maybe for some more different -- or some different
4 options for people inside buildings as opposed to just
5 going inside their classrooms and locking their door.
6 I'm beginning to see some changes in some of the doctrine
7 that talk about fighting and fleeing and using those
8 options a little more liberally than perhaps they are
9 used now. Where somebody in the building confronts the
10 person as opposed to everybody just waiting for the
11 police to show up and engage in that confrontation.

12 That, too, could be controversial, as you can
13 imagine. We will wait to see how the doctrine develops
14 along that line for instruction.

15 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Dr. Schwartz.

16 DR. SCHWARTZ: Thank you for your testimony and
17 for your work in reviewing the police actions in this
18 immediate response. I have two questions. And for the
19 first I want to go back to the very most immediate
20 response back to what was going on in dispatch. And this
21 really is for my information. It may be useful for other
22 commission members. I have long wondered what happens in
23 dispatch when the dispatcher is receiving information,
24 that information is critical, often needs to keep the
25 caller on the line, at what point and how does the

1 outgoing transmission of information start if one person
2 is receiving it? Is that a shared responsibility with
3 another person coming online? Could you please explain
4 how that part works. I'll save my second question until
5 we've had this discussion.

6 CHIEF REED: That is a challenge, and when we
7 hire dispatchers, it's something that's very hard to
8 assess a candidate to see if they are able to do this
9 type of multitasking. But as you listen to the audio
10 tapes, the person gets the initial information and then
11 as the person on the phone is talking, and I think this
12 perhaps frustrates some who listen to these tapes that
13 aren't trained in this type or have not witnessed what a
14 dispatcher does, the person on the other end is talking,
15 saying hello, are you there? Are you there? You are
16 thinking why isn't the dispatcher responding. The reason
17 is the dispatcher is communicating the information that
18 was received to another dispatcher and also either
19 hitting a foot pedal or a button and starting to put that
20 information over the air. We see this all the time in
21 our dispatch centers where critical information is
22 literally coming in the ear -- it's almost like a news
23 reporter, the critical information is coming in through
24 the ear of the dispatcher and at the same time they are
25 pushing the button saying okay, we have an emergency

1 situation at 123 Main Street, can you tell me the
2 description of the suspect. So they are talking on the
3 phone and talking into the radio at the same time.

4 And that's what we saw happen in this
5 situation. And the call taker was trying to put
6 information over the air and at the same time say certain
7 key phrases that would alert the other dispatcher that
8 we've got more here than just a routine telephone call
9 coming in. So it's -- it really comes down to talent and
10 it's not a job that just anybody off the street is suited
11 for. And as we heard in these audio tapes, they did an
12 exceptional job of taking in that information,
13 synthesizing it and spitting it right back out even while
14 information was still coming in and getting the critical
15 information to the officers so that they could start
16 their response.

17 DR. SCHWARTZ: Thank you, that's very helpful.
18 So it's essentially a subjective decision that the
19 dispatcher has to make and it requires -- depends on the
20 dispatcher's skill and his capacity, or her capacity to
21 handle these -- the conflicting priorities of
22 receiving --

23 CHIEF REED: Absolutely.

24 DR. SCHWARTZ: -- and giving information at the
25 same time.

1 SPEAKER: And at the same time trying to calm
2 the person on the phone and thinking of what questions do
3 I need to ask next that are going to be most helpful to
4 the officer that's responding.

5 So it is an incredible challenge for a
6 dispatcher.

7 CHIEF MONTMINY: Also understand that in a
8 bigger PSAP, as one person is taking in the call, the
9 other dispatchers are hearing the call coming in and
10 they're looking at their monitors. Because the first
11 dispatcher is typing this information into the computer
12 and everybody else is getting those calls out and getting
13 the units rolling. A lot of time people are under the
14 impression that nothing happens until they end that 911
15 call. In reality that's not true. Usually the units are
16 already responding, all the other dispatchers have
17 already been made aware that we have an active shooter
18 here and they are working on other parts of this to get
19 the ball rolling as quickly as possible. So sometimes
20 it's -- when you have a one dispatcher responsible for
21 all duties, they're going back and forth between the
22 phone and the radio. Other times other people handle the
23 radio and the dispatcher can concentrate on the call.

24 DR. SCHWARTZ: Is there one message sent that
25 would go, for instance, to all Newtown police officers?

1 CHIEF MONTMINY: That's exactly what happens.
2 Well in this case, the first dispatcher calls and sends
3 the unit that's available in that area, but every other
4 unit hears it and responds to the call. Other
5 situations, it may simply be a tone that goes out that
6 everybody who hears that tone knows stop what you're
7 doing, listen to what I've got. And it doesn't need to
8 be said, but sometimes it's simply said all units respond
9 to and that means everybody. That means everybody at the
10 police station, that means everybody on the road, that
11 means the chief and the deputy chief. That means
12 everybody.

13 CHIEF REED: The level of sophistication as you
14 can imagine from PSAP to PSAP is very different. And to
15 go to the chairman's comments regarding the
16 consolidation, this is one of the areas where perhaps
17 consolidation is beneficial because you have a larger
18 center with better technology, supposedly, with increased
19 technology that can function more to that degree where
20 you have multiple call takers and you have multiple
21 dispatchers. And the call taker's function is to take in
22 the call, triage the call and immediately enter the data.
23 And the dispatcher's responsibility is to take that data
24 and send a car out and forward it off to the mobile data
25 terminal in the officer's cruiser so the officer has some

1 sort of written memorial of what is happening as it's
2 occurring.

3 Again, the level of sophistication is very
4 different from town to town and from PSAP to PSAP.

5 DR. SCHWARTZ: Thank you. My second question,
6 I thought I read someplace, correct me if I'm wrong, that
7 there's a disjunction between the state police radio
8 system and the radios of local police. Not that that
9 would have had any bearing on the outcome here as the
10 state -- as the Newtown police officer's arrived
11 substantially before the state police. But is that
12 correct? Is there an issue -- was there an issue at all
13 even in the aftermath of this incident with regard to the
14 capacity of radio systems for everybody to be on the same
15 page?

16 CHIEF REED: Was it an issue? I don't know --
17 I don't know if I identify it as an issue, because I
18 don't know that it harmed the response time. Because
19 they were certainly notified quickly and I think it was
20 within four minutes of the first Newtown officer getting
21 there the first trooper showed up.

22 The Connecticut State Police is an incredible
23 organization and they have a great group of dedicated and
24 professional law enforcement people that are associated
25 with the organization. But with that being said, they

1 are a huge organization, and anything that is done in
2 that organization I imagine must be from a resource
3 perspective very difficult to do and to implement.

4 Their radio system, I don't know how
5 interoperable it is with other local police departments.
6 I do know in some regions of the state you have a shared
7 frequency, that we can speak from our police department
8 and all of the dispatchers in our region can hear us,
9 including the state police dispatcher. So if we need
10 something, we say, you know, the name of the community to
11 the other community and we can get information out to
12 them immediately. The state police is certainly one of
13 the agencies that monitors that and responds to it.

14 I'm not sure in the Newtown area if they have
15 that type of what we call a hot line up here, or even
16 RAFS which is the Regional Access Frequency System. I'm
17 not sure how much interoperability they have with state
18 police radios down there and I don't think I'm suited so
19 answer specifically what their radio interaction was.

20 DR. SCHWARTZ: And I certainly intended no
21 criticism of any, nor any suggestion that anything in
22 terms of interoperability of the radio systems would have
23 led to a better outcome in this incident.

24 Clearly the local police were on the scene in
25 the critical moments of this. And - but I do note, I go

1 back to 9/11 and the response to that disaster of the
2 Twin Towers in New York and I know that interoperability
3 of first responder communications was an issue. And
4 looking to the future, and after all it is our charge to
5 learn everything we possibly can, to look to better
6 responses and better outcomes in the future. Even though
7 it had no impact on this incident, if there is still a
8 question of interoperability of communication systems
9 between police agencies or other first responding
10 agencies in the state, is that an issue -- is that an
11 area of possible enhancement of our capacity to respond
12 to such incidents?

13 CHIEF MONTMINY: Well, the federal government
14 has taken on that task you just described. After 9/11
15 when interoperability was a huge issue in the response,
16 the federal government dedicated band width in the
17 700 megahertz frequency range to public safety coast to
18 coast. In addition to that, they also provided seed
19 money to get that coast to coast network up and running.

20 The reality is it's been funded, but it's in
21 the process of being built out as we speak. So we are
22 how many years removed from 9/11, it's just happening as
23 we speak. But there's a total of 20 megahertz worth of
24 band width in the 700 megahertz frequency. This is the
25 band width that was vacated by the television over the

1 air. You remember several years ago you had to either
2 replace your TV or you wouldn't be able to get analog
3 video any more? That's the band width that was removed
4 from the air waves, and that band width was
5 rededicated -- 20 megahertz of it was rededicated to
6 public safety coast to coast. So that frequency range
7 has been freed up for that very purpose that you just
8 described, to help with interoperability between public
9 safety and first responders in the event of an emergency.

10 It just -- it isn't built out yet coast to
11 coast.

12 DR. FORRESTER: Again, thank you for your
13 report. I just have a question, I know FEMA just came
14 out with new response around medics going in to the "warm
15 zone" and wondering if that would be a recommendation or
16 a thought that you had. I know the devastation was so
17 awful. But just wondering if that would be something
18 that you would consider as a strong recommendation for
19 us?

20 CHIEF MONTMINY: I can talk to that. The
21 reality is I think that is going to be the new trend.
22 Manchester has been discussing this with our medical
23 first responders. And the concept is really one of a
24 warm zone. If you can consider the active shooter
25 location to be the hot zone, perhaps there should be a

1 warm zone that we could bring medical people into to
2 provide emergency first aid to stop people from bleeding
3 out or dying. And this is a conversation that we've had
4 with our local fire department who provides paramedic
5 service. And the paramedics are on board and we are
6 looking to move this kind of a program forward. Although
7 it would be local to Manchester, the thought would be
8 this could end up being the way that first responders
9 move from a medical perspective across the state.

10 So the concept that we have now is the first
11 police officers on the scene are charged with stopping
12 the shooter. They are not charged with rescuing victims.
13 They are not charged with stopping people from bleeding.
14 They are charged with stopping the shooter.

15 And so that means they literally have to bypass
16 victims on their way to that first responsibility. Well
17 what ends up happening, it happened in Manchester and it
18 happened in several other places, that a certain amount
19 of time takes place where we believe we've stopped the
20 shooter. But yet no one's found a second shooter, no
21 one's searched the building yet and that could take 45
22 minutes or so to search the rest of the school, for
23 example. What happens to the victims during that time
24 frame? In this case, we happened to know from video and
25 audio recordings that they took viable patients and

1 simply grabbed them up in hand and ran out of the
2 building. But what would you do if they were adults or
3 too big to do that?

4 And the reality is, our thought is you set up a
5 warm zone and that is, you know, if it was a school,
6 perhaps the warm zone would be the cafeteria. And you
7 provide police protection over that warm zone and then
8 you bring in paramedics and let them treat those people
9 instantly. I think that's kind of the concept that
10 you're talking about and I think that's where training is
11 going with regard -- you know there's a lot more
12 interaction now between police and medical responders
13 than there ever has been before. I think this is a
14 middle ground that meets both their needs.

15 Of course nobody wants to send unarmed
16 individuals, unprotected individuals into a potential
17 shooting situation. But I think they are willing to go
18 into a warm zone if they have police protection to stop
19 people from dying.

20 DR. SCHONFELD: One other point that I noticed
21 in the report was that the comment that it took some time
22 to also secure the exterior of the building because there
23 was someone from the media who was responding. I don't
24 know what is the current situation. Obviously once the
25 area has been physically secured, then they would be

1 trespassing or would be violating police security
2 perimeter.

3 But prior to the establishment of that, should
4 there be -- are there currently any regulations or laws
5 related to that and should there be? Because I think one
6 of our charges is to come up with legislative
7 recommendations.

8 Is that an issue that happens with any
9 frequency? Is it something we should be considering?

10 CHIEF REED: It's rare where you have a scene
11 where you have two or more police cars and you don't have
12 a member of the media not far behind looking to see
13 exactly what's happening. We try to work with the local
14 media here in Connecticut so they understand what our
15 responsibilities are when we first get to a scene and why
16 it's important that we focus our efforts on stopping the
17 crime and locating the suspect as opposed to having to
18 worry about whether their member of the media is trying
19 to get through into our crime scene. For the most part,
20 we find cooperation and they understand that we need to
21 maintain the integrity of the crime scene and we don't
22 want them to trespass into the crime scene.

23 What happened here -- and it certainly happened
24 in other places, whether it was -- Hartford Distributors
25 was one of the other critical incidents of note that have

1 occurred through the state -- is there's always someone
2 who tries to get that extra picture or go that extra
3 step. I don't know how statutorily you can regulate
4 that. I think it's a very slippery slope when you start
5 to try to regulate access that the media has. Generally
6 if somebody was in their back yard that lived in a house
7 and they had a good eye view of the crime scene and a
8 member of the media asked if they could be there, too,
9 it's very hard to say you can't be there and take
10 pictures of this particular crime scene.

11 So it is always a challenge to deal with the
12 media for the police, particularly you can imagine in a
13 situation like that where there were so many other things
14 to focus on. And ultimately there was a media team that
15 became the focus of one of the searches and it took some
16 time to understand that they were who in fact they were
17 and they weren't bad actors in this particular situation.
18 So that's a distraction. I'm not sure how you limit
19 that.

20 We work well with the Connecticut media, but we
21 find that if we have a notable event and we have media
22 come in from outside the state, or perhaps national
23 media, that they tend to be a little less constrainable;
24 and do what they want to do because it's what they do.
25 And it's unfortunate. But I'm not sure how further we

1 regulate it. As agencies we try to deal with them and
2 keep them from getting, you know -- we try to set up a
3 point where they can go and get information so they are
4 not leaking into these other areas. That's one of the
5 ways we've dealt with it and we tried to spread that
6 message to our agencies throughout Connecticut. It's a
7 necessary evil perhaps in some people's minds, but you
8 have to designate somebody that can handle those media
9 inquiries almost immediately so they are drawn to one
10 particular spot and they are not going to all of the
11 perimeter areas trying to get pictures and to get
12 information.

13 DR. SCHONFELD: The way it seemed to be implied
14 in the report, or maybe my assumption was this happened
15 within minutes of the police report and as the building
16 was being secured. So it wasn't from out-of-state media
17 and it wasn't people looking for interviews and they
18 couldn't have been referred someplace else. The issue
19 is -- and that they were in the woods. So it seems to me
20 that the actions are a serious distraction that undermine
21 the safety and security of the police officers that are
22 responding as well as the people in the building for
23 which were trying to come up with a legitimate response.
24 I'm not in any way trying to talk about limiting media's
25 access to be able to cover stories that have occurred,

1 but it has to be done in such a way that it doesn't
2 interfere with the response and endanger people. So I
3 understand it might be tricky, but I'm wondering if this
4 was just an unusual situation or do the police more than
5 occasionally have to contend with securing the site
6 including trying to determine whether or not people that
7 are in that area might be perpetrators or media covering
8 the story.

9 CHIEF MONTMINY: I just want to point out I
10 don't think that came from our report, but I heard the
11 same thing that you did that there was a reporter. Our
12 experience -- my experience has been that I used to think
13 that the press was a nuisance until I had an incident
14 that attracted nationwide attention and realized that by
15 helicopter we're only 15 or 20 minutes away from New York
16 City. When the national media descends on you, that's
17 when you typically have problems. Our local media is
18 just terrific. When we say, hey, please don't do this or
19 do that, typically we get cooperation from them.

20 We've had problems in scenarios where a
21 reporter got overly zealous and tried to do something
22 that was clearly unsafe or caused us to have to react to
23 it. That happens very infrequently, in my opinion.

24 CHIEF REED: I agree.

25 MR. MCCARTHY: You've talked about some warm

1 zone activities, and certainly your experience in
2 Manchester where every surrounding police department
3 responded to that event. And in Newtown where every
4 police officer, including the chief, was engaged in the
5 event in Newtown.

6 The issue of command and control becomes
7 paramount in these situations and it's difficult for any
8 organization to set up a command -- a functional command
9 post in three, four minutes as it takes some time. But
10 do you have any recommendations from your personal
11 experience in Manchester and in evaluating the Newtown
12 event about command and control activities and the
13 importance of that? Because I think it is important for
14 us to include some comments about how to manage these
15 incidents for everybody's safety.

16 CHIEF MONTMINY: With regard to command and
17 control, the Manchester event that you referenced, I got
18 to tell you the simplest, easiest way to have that happen
19 is to hand it over to the fire department. The fire
20 departments do command and control at almost every
21 situation that they do. Police departments routinely do
22 not do that, and so when we do do it, it's a rarity. So
23 I found that it's simply easier if you have a good
24 working relationship with your fire department, let the
25 fire department set up the command and control.

1 Within the first couple of minutes of an
2 incident like what took place at Sandy Hook, there was no
3 opportunity for command and control. That simply cannot
4 be your primary focus while somebody is shooting
5 children. But after the fact, command and control became
6 a huge issue and no one knows how to do it better than
7 fire departments.

8 And it just so happens that in Manchester we
9 have a terrific relationship with our fire department and
10 they were first on scene, they set up the command and
11 control structure and called for all the support that we
12 needed. Before we even knew what we needed, the fire
13 department had envisioned what we would need and took
14 care of that. So the command and control infrastructure
15 had been set up for us. It was just waiting for us to
16 arrive. I think that's a great thing simply because the
17 fire department does it on a daily basis and we do it
18 every two years.

19 So that would be my recommendation is to have a
20 working relationship with your fire department and have
21 your fire department assist you with that infrastructure.

22 CHIEF REED: One comment. The first time you
23 meet the chief next door or the tactical officers in the
24 municipality next to you should not be the critical
25 incident that's happening in your town. We're very

1 fortunate in the capitol region that we have a very
2 effective regional policing initiative that's gone on for
3 more than two decades through Capitol Region
4 Investigative Support Team; the Capitol Region Emergency
5 Services Team; metro Traffic Services; Eastern
6 Connecticut Narcotics Task Force. There are a number of
7 regionalized police services that are available in the
8 capitol region; and those of us in the capitol region as
9 we move through the state to other parts of state find
10 that that's not the same throughout the state. And there
11 are police departments who live in their own singular
12 world as if they are in a silo and there are not
13 cooperative agreements with surrounding communities.

14 And I think that's hurtful, because when -- I
15 always say you're going to be judged most critically
16 during the most critical incident. And it's during that
17 most critical incident where you need to have the
18 cooperation of the people around you. And I think that
19 is what is going to assist you to have some effective
20 command and control. When you have chiefs or other
21 leaders from other agencies show up in your community
22 during the critical stint and be able to help you deploy
23 your troops, deploy the other resources that show up.
24 But again, the first time you meet those people shouldn't
25 be at your critical incident, you should be meeting them

1 regularly, training and drilling with them regularly.
2 And again we're fortunate in the capitol region that
3 happens frequently.

4 But I don't know that it's the same all
5 throughout the state. I would think some sort of a take
6 away or recommendation would be perhaps the encouragement
7 of regionalized policing initiatives. But you know this
8 is a challenge even here in the capital region. We have
9 one community where the bargaining unit went to the labor
10 board and said you can't bring police officers into our
11 community to do police work because we are the only
12 people allowed to do police work in our community. And
13 we have a court decision that said yeah, they're right.
14 As a result they have stymied some of the progress of the
15 regional service sharing initiatives because they have a
16 court decision that says they don't have to participate
17 in those types of activities. And that other police
18 officers can't come in and do police work in their town
19 because they are the sole organization that can do police
20 work in their town. It's kind of horse and buggy
21 thinking, especially in these days, this day and age.
22 Because you need regionalization I think in order to be
23 effective, efficient and to survive as a professional law
24 enforcement agency.

25 MR. McCARTHY: Thank you.

1 DR. BENTMAN: A couple of questions. One has
2 to do -- this probably didn't come from your report and
3 probably came from the other materials that we have. But
4 the alert to the entire school came from an intercom that
5 happened to be in a room that had -- was having a team
6 meeting with a family that was located very near the
7 office. And it turns out that those intercoms aren't
8 located in every room in the school. And I wondered
9 whether you would like to make a recommendation regarding
10 the value of that availability. I have no idea what the
11 cost is.

12 CHIEF REED: I think there was a report that
13 CPCA presented perhaps to this commission early on that
14 dealt with some of the crime prevention initiatives that
15 are recognized when it comes to school police relations.
16 And one of the recommendations, or the items cited I
17 believe is the ability to communicate openly from room to
18 room through some sort of an intercom system. An
19 intercom system that's -- now you can imagine intercom
20 systems in schools are challenging, because as kids get
21 older and become a little mischievous perhaps the
22 intercom system may be used for something other than what
23 you envisioned it being used for.

24 So as a result of that, the intercom system may
25 exist, you may have to dial a three, four, five digit

1 code on the phone in order to open up the intercom
2 system. The substitute teacher may or may not know how
3 the intercom system works. So the intercom system is a
4 good recommendation and is certainly a solid
5 recommendation because there should be a way to talk to
6 everybody throughout the facility. But at the same time
7 you can understand why organizations or schools are
8 hesitant to make it too easily accessible because other
9 things can happen over that system.

10 So yes, we do encourage that. In fact, we
11 encourage it not just in schools, but in businesses, in
12 other town buildings. How many town buildings, other
13 than schools, can you make an all call intercom
14 announcement? I think you will find relatively few of
15 them because they're old buildings, they ought to be
16 retrofitted. It would cost a lot of money. And what
17 people don't always think that you can certainly have
18 this type of critical incident occur at a town hall or a
19 board of education office. So the use of intercoms, or
20 the placement of intercoms is a worthwhile investment I
21 think for any facility.

22 DR. BENTMAN: Another question has to do with
23 whether there would be any -- whether the responsibility
24 for gathering information needs to rest entirely with the
25 dispatcher or whether instruction to adults in a school

1 system who are practicing a lockdown and the kind of
2 information that the dispatcher would find of value,
3 whether that is now a part of their instruction, whether
4 it would be useful to you all?

5 CHIEF REED: It would be useful. We instruct
6 our dispatchers as to, you know, who, what, where, when,
7 why, how, the basic questions that anybody asking
8 questions about an event they don't know anything about
9 would be asking.

10 So we encourage our dispatchers, or our
11 dispatchers are trained to glean that information by
12 asking a series of questions to the person on the other
13 line. I have to admit I'm not sure how all schools are
14 being trained when it comes to their lockdown procedures.
15 Are they being trained to try to identify a suspect and
16 what are the key pieces of information? Where in the
17 school are they, what direction are they going, are they
18 holding a weapon, what are they wearing? All things you
19 can imagine in that critical moment, or those critical
20 few moments are probably challenging for any teacher to
21 note and recall in the midst of a telephone call. So I
22 think that can certainly be part of the training doctrine
23 for schools, or any facility that you go to to try to
24 teach people the right way to make a 911 call. We do it
25 with young kids when we teach them how to call 911. Know

1 what your own phone number is, know what your home
2 address is. Because we all know in the state -- in the
3 age of cell phones, you make a 911 call, that call is not
4 necessarily going to go to the town that you expect it to
5 go to. So you may make a 911 phone call from here out in
6 the parking lot at the LLB and Hartford may get it, East
7 Hartford may get it, the Connecticut state police may get
8 it. So it's always important to say exactly where you
9 were when you make that 911 phone call. Those are the
10 types of things we teach all people to remember and to
11 report when they are making a report.

12 And I think it would perhaps be an important
13 recommendation, or a useful recommendation to say that in
14 the training of school staff, this is the type of
15 information that they need to do the best they can to
16 glean and pass on to a dispatcher.

17 DR. SCHWARTZ: Since your report was focused on
18 basically the response characteristics, protocols and
19 timing, is there anything you discovered as part of that
20 about officer-to-officer communication we can do better?
21 I'm focusing on general flow of information as officer to
22 dispatch, dispatch back to office. But men on scene have
23 radios, they communicate with each other. As two teams
24 began to move into the building, is there anything that
25 you saw or gleaned in this -- and this may be more

1 pertinent to the attorney's report -- but working with
2 the law enforcement community and the officers in the
3 field, do we have the technology or is there something we
4 can improve in the technology for officer-to-officer
5 communication, team to team that might improve
6 situational awareness and response on site? I would be
7 interested in that.

8 CHIEF REED: I think that's a dilemma and
9 challenge that every law enforcement agency, and I
10 imagine fire department, deals with all the time. How do
11 you communicate once you're in the building? Now when I
12 tell you that our review did not deal with team to team
13 communication inside the building. Because once they
14 were inside the building, that kind of was where our
15 timeline came to an end. Our focus was how long did it
16 take for them to get there and when did they get into
17 the building?

18 But I will tell you from some anecdotes that
19 I've heard from responders that were a part of it, there
20 is a challenge -- and we dealt with it with our radio
21 system in the community where I am -- communicating, once
22 you get inside some of these fortified buildings, that is
23 these buildings that have cement block walls all the way
24 ground to ceiling, or are brick ground to ceiling,
25 depending on radio system and the radio frequency you

1 use, it is a challenge to talk from room to room on the
2 radios that some departments are issued.

3 I know in our community, our high school is
4 less than a quarter of a mile from our police department,
5 but once somebody went through those front doors, they
6 could not talk back to the police department on their
7 radio. It ultimately prompted us to change our frequency
8 at 800 megahertz band width, which if you don't have it
9 built out just right is very challenging under normal
10 circumstances. But once you get inside, brick walls
11 becomes even more challenging, you lose your
12 communication ability.

13 So our middle school officer and our high
14 school officer not only could they not talk to each
15 other, but they could not talk back to the police
16 department from inside the police facility. So that
17 required an entire revamp of our radio system to the tune
18 of about \$450,000. Fortunately we were able to do it
19 with a federal grant. But I point that out to say that
20 there are recommendations for funds to be sent, are spent
21 on school security and mental health issues. I would
22 just hope that somewhere along the line there are some
23 funds spent for police equipment, police training and
24 police personnel because these are the responders.

25 And not only do we need the people to respond

1 to the scene, we even need to have the right equipment
2 once they get to the scene. And they need to be able to
3 communicate what they are seeing, what they'r hearing,
4 what they're perceiving on the scene to other officers
5 that are there and to the dispatch centers. And perhaps
6 have a series of best practices or recommendations for
7 the equipment that is going to provide the best
8 penetration in the buildings and the best revival
9 communication from any location in the community back to
10 the dispatch center.

11 And I know we dealt with that for years and
12 years. I mean for 26 years I've been in my community and
13 we dealt with it all the way up until four years ago when
14 we finally made the change. I can imagine some larger
15 organization -- statewide organizations that have had
16 trouble historically with communications how you address
17 that without some funding behind it.

18 DR. SCHWARTZ: Thank you. Because I think a
19 lot of the focus goes on how quickly do we get people
20 there. But the efficiency with which they deal with the
21 event on site is in a large part dependent upon officers,
22 whether it's fire or police, intercommunicating with each
23 other and, you know, the provision of an RF study in
24 advance to determine when you get in that building, how
25 well it works. You don't want to find out when you're

1 there that you don't have it. And the recommendation you
2 made it salient and appreciated. Thank you.

3 CHIEF MONTMINY: I want to point out one last
4 thing. There was, as we said, there were two entry teams
5 that entered the building relatively simultaneously,
6 within probably a minute or two. There was no indication
7 from what we heard on the radio that they were aware of
8 each other's entry.

9 MR. MCCARTHY: Chiefs, now that we're a year
10 out from the incident, I'm concerned, I'm sure you are,
11 and so is the commission, about the impact on the police
12 officers. Although it's not part of your report, I'm
13 sure that you have formulated some opinion. Is there
14 anything that you would recommend that we as a state or
15 as municipalities that we can do to better support police
16 officers and other responders who suffer the long-term
17 impacts of such a horrific response?

18 CHIEF MONTMINY: I would have a couple
19 recommendations for you. First thing I would recommend
20 is mandatory EAP intervention. The reason I say
21 mandatory is because for years police officers who were
22 involved in shootings received no psychiatric assistance
23 whatsoever because it was deemed that if they did that
24 they would be ostracized by the rest of their peers. As
25 a result, law enforcement agencies across the country

1 changed to make it mandatory; therefore there was no
2 ostracizing of an individual, you had to do it, it was
3 part of policy.

4 Well the reality is this should be part of
5 policy as well. When you go through an incident like
6 this, you -- I mean if you want to meet with your EAP
7 provider and say I'm fine, thank you very much, I don't
8 need any further assistance, that's fine. But I think
9 everybody should be brought to that table, and that
10 includes the dispatchers. Because the only person more
11 impacted by this kind of a response than the officers is
12 perhaps the dispatchers who are sitting in four walls and
13 they can't do anything other than witness by radio their
14 co-workers going into harm's way. And I want to point
15 out also that the latest trend in this area is that this
16 kind of trauma is a -- there's a constant impact. It
17 doesn't just happen once, it happens throughout the
18 course of a career. It's a cumulative process.

19 So this kind of thing may not affect the
20 officer today, but it may in four or five years.

21 MS. FLAHERTY: Thank you for your report. I
22 just in terms of what you spoke about, about mental
23 health treatment that officers might need as a result of
24 their service. I'm wondering if you could speak to the
25 impact of the provisions of the gun law that say if

1 anybody needs voluntary treatment and admits himself to
2 treatment for hospitalization, that they are put on a
3 registry and may have their license to carry taken away
4 from them and how that especially may impact police
5 officers.

6 CHIEF REED: In law enforcement we deal with
7 mental health issues, as does any profession, not just of
8 officers after they have engaged in some critical
9 incident or witnessed some horror. But sometimes people
10 deteriorate over time and I know I commiserate with my
11 colleagues sometimes because maybe you have an officer
12 who's wellness you question perhaps particularly their
13 psychologic wellness. And we say well who do we get to
14 tell us whether this officer is still fit to work or not
15 to work? And inevitably we find some clinician --
16 although there's not a uniform standard as to what level
17 of training this clinician needs to have. Is this a
18 licensed clinical social work, is this a psychologist, is
19 this a psychiatrist, is this somebody who has experience
20 as a forensic psychologist and has certain credentials
21 behind them. There's no real uniform standard.

22 So unfortunately we find someone who's willing
23 to do the job and will provide them with some guidelines
24 and may provide some sort of diagnosis. Or if they are
25 not able to diagnose, some sort of report as to whether

1 in their opinion this person is fit to continue to
2 perform their job. And then inevitably -- or I shouldn't
3 say inevitably, but perhaps this person is relieved from
4 duty. But as you know, any time you are going to take
5 away a person's ability to do their job, you have to have
6 due process and this is a significant taking of
7 somebody's right.

8 So there's always a challenge that goes with
9 it. So now the bargaining unit comes up with a clinician
10 who renders an opinion which oftentimes is in opposition
11 to the opinion rendered by the town or the city and then
12 you have to engage a third person.

13 So my point is, who's rendering the opinions?
14 What's the standard going to be, not just for police
15 officers, for anybody, for somebody to render the opinion
16 that a person is not fit to carry a weapon. And is it
17 appropriate -- how is that ultimately challenged or
18 affirmed; or is it enough to say just because somebody
19 thinks this person is not psychologically capable of
20 carrying a weapon in the interest of safety, that's
21 enough to take their permit away?

22 So I guess I'm going to answer a question with
23 a question. Or kind of it's a bit confounding to really
24 come up with an answer to that. I think there has to be
25 some recognition that mental health has an impact, or may

1 have an impact on a person's ability to make the
2 decisions necessary to use or carry a firearm.

3 But I don't know -- I guess I'm not in a
4 position to offer a solution, or a better solution than
5 what exists in the laws as it's written now.

6 I don't know, does that answer the question at
7 all? Does it impact an officer? Certainly it could,
8 sure.

9 MS. FLAHERTY: I guess it's more that we've
10 heard -- I've heard anecdotally that some people are
11 being encouraged to seek treatment out of state. I don't
12 know if you've heard the same thing or if you have any
13 comments about that?

14 CHIEF REED: I have not heard that. I don't
15 have any particular comment on it.

16 CHIEF MONTMINY: I have not heard it either.

17 MR. SANDFORD: Chiefs, I think you did a great
18 job putting the report together. It's interesting that
19 you gave -- you took 13 minutes to give us the report,
20 and if you look at the timeline of why you were giving
21 that report, halfway through it, everything was over. It
22 was really quite amazing. That -- and you think about
23 how fast Newtown responded in under three minutes, it
24 really -- What a great job. So there's some lessons
25 there.

1 I think you've told us that Newtown had
2 policies, proper policies in place, they had the proper
3 procedures in place. They did the right things. And if
4 schools had a good relationship with local police
5 departments it really would make the police officers' job
6 easier in responding to these types of incidents.

7 So the question is, we have this knowledge, we
8 have a wonderful report that you've written. Is it going
9 to take action by this commission or action by the
10 Legislature to take it to the next step to implement it?
11 What do we do to get the Police Chiefs Association to
12 meet with the Superintendent of Schools Association, or
13 with the Principals Association, or with another
14 educational association to get together and talk about
15 this and develop -- take this document and get -- make
16 this to the front of the burner for all the schools in
17 the state of Connecticut and put it on the front of the
18 burner for all the police departments. Not every police
19 department is Sandy Hook. I would think you would agree
20 that not every police department has all of the things
21 that Sandy Hook had.

22 So we have a nice report. We've experienced a
23 tragedy. How do we make something good come out of this?
24 You started it, what do we do next? Do we need to do
25 something here to force that to happen, or is that

1 something that the association can do, you know, at
2 police chiefs meeting with the Superintendents of Schools
3 Association? Where do we go from here?

4 CHIEF REED: I think there have been some good
5 steps taken so far. The safe schools initiatives that
6 came through monies that were available through the COPS
7 (ph.) office in the past decade, there have been safe
8 school -- secure our school grant money that was
9 available. One of the things the grant did is it
10 required you to enter into an agreement with the school,
11 the same with the school resource officer grants. So it
12 forced you to enter into a relationship with the school
13 and to have these collaborative documents drawn up that
14 were acknowledged and signed by both the chief police
15 officer, the chief school official and the municipal CEO
16 so everybody worked together to secure these grants and
17 pledged to continue to work down that road of
18 cooperativeness.

19 When the state offered some school security
20 money, shortly after this incident occurred, there were
21 very similar requirements. You had to go through the
22 national clearing house for school security and do the
23 checklist for the facilities that you wanted to fund and
24 you were forced to get into these -- enter into these
25 collaborative relationships with the school department.

1 I think that type of encouragement has to
2 continue to exist to say look, we're willing to give you
3 money for police training and to better your response to
4 active shooter situations, but you need to work in
5 cooperation with the schools. Schools need to buy into
6 the process.

7 I think as chiefs we try to go out there and
8 spread the word and forge these relationships. But of
9 course it has to be a two-way street and it has to come
10 from the top down. So the mayor, as chief elected
11 official, or if you have a town manager who is a
12 professional manager, you know they may or may not take
13 this as one of their priorities. And we all know
14 sometimes it takes that top down prioritization in order
15 to make some of these things happen.

16 Money is where it all lies. If there's going
17 to be money made available, perhaps there has to be some
18 requirement that there is an entry into this
19 collaborative relationship so that you are forced to work
20 hand in hand with your school district.

21 I would hope that as we have moved in this year
22 and months since this tragedy, and so many other
23 tragedies that have been brought to the forefront even
24 since this happened, that superintendents are
25 understanding that whether they like their police

1 department or not, they've got to work cooperatively with
2 them in order to fund some of these initiatives
3 successfully and to have them on your side. I mean you
4 want the police officers to be there, to know what your
5 facility is like and to respond immediately when
6 something happens.

7 You know of course as a law enforcement agency
8 we have many constituencies. Yes, we have to worry about
9 the schools, but many of us have large manufacturing
10 facilities or distribution facilities, 100,000-plus
11 square foot malls. And it's just as important that our
12 officers are familiar with the layouts of those
13 facilities and be able to respond to those facilities in
14 the event of a critical incident.

15 So we really have -- It's important that the
16 schools are safe and secure, not just during the school
17 day. That's another thing, what happens in your schools
18 after school hours? What happens when CCD is in there
19 and Boy Scouts are in there and Girl Scouts are in there
20 and then travel basketball team is in there? These
21 buildings are even more vulnerable, with the same
22 population, they just changed from school books to
23 basketballs. So what is the process? I know we are
24 struggling with that in our community when another
25 organization is now using the school, how are they

1 restricting entry in and out of the school? And what's
2 their plan in the event something goes bad, somebody
3 walks into a school gymnasium at 7:00 at night during
4 basketball practice and there's 50 kids there; what's the
5 plan then?

6 So we're starting to look at those challenges.
7 Because the school day is six hours, what happens the
8 rest of the time that school building is used for public
9 activity.

10 MR. SANFORD: The other comment I would like to
11 make, again I'm not being critical of any organization,
12 but we have local police departments in how many towns?

13 CHIEF REED: 103 out of 169.

14 MR. SANDFORD: So that means there's 66 towns
15 that are relying upon the Department of Public Safety or
16 state police to provide that protection. And that's a
17 tall order for your department to handle your schools,
18 for them to handle 60-some-odd other departments or
19 schools is a relatively tall order. And you look at if
20 something had happened in a more rural scenario, the
21 response times would not have been two and a half
22 minutes, unless there happened to be a trooper in the
23 area.

24 So I think you have to lay the whole thing.
25 And it really comes down to the work that you've done

1 already. You've laid the foundation and now we need to
2 move forward. So maybe that's something this commission
3 needs to look at, what resources are needed at a state
4 level and also at a local level?

5 Maybe I'm really going to go out on a very thin
6 limb here, but maybe we need to take those school
7 resource officers out of the schools and put them in a
8 dispatch center so that that dispatcher can turn to a law
9 enforcement that now has access to cameras and has access
10 to information and can rely -- relay that information, I
11 think as Chief McCarthy said, to those responding
12 officers. That may be a better use of that funding
13 rather than having officers in the schools.

14 Just a thought. But thank you for your work, I
15 think you did a great job.

16 DR. SCHWARTZ: I would like to go back to
17 amplify on the comments or question that was made earlier
18 about the voluntary reporting law for psychiatric
19 hospitalization.

20 I'm not sure if there's a question here for
21 you, or if I'm just trying to put something on the
22 record. But there might be a question. You may not be
23 aware that in the legislation that was passed by the
24 state legislature last year regarding guns, mental health
25 and school safety. That the reporting of voluntary

1 psychiatric admissions means that a police officer who
2 chooses to voluntarily admit him or herself to a
3 psychiatric hospital following their own awareness of a
4 psychiatric issue will lose their capacity to carry a
5 weapon for six months. So -- and I'm certain that would
6 have implications for you in terms of the position of
7 that police officer, that police officer's job going
8 forward.

9 This is -- Paradoxically in the face of a
10 contradictory situation that were that police officer to
11 be hospitalized involuntarily through what's called a
12 Physician Emergency Certificate or a PEC, which is
13 actually the most common type of involuntary
14 hospitalization in the state of Connecticut, that police
15 officer's psychiatric hospitalization won't be reported
16 to you. It will not be reported to the Department of
17 Mental Health. It will not go to Public Safety. That
18 police officer will be able to resume carrying a gun the
19 moment of discharge from the hospital.

20 So without I think broadening the discussion
21 now, I think the commission needs to look at this issue,
22 but I don't think it's an issue for today with regard to
23 the merit of the voluntary -- the reporting for voluntary
24 admissions. In think -- I wonder if you are concerned or
25 would choose to make some recommendation about the fact

1 that a police officer involuntarily admitted -- and it's
2 important to note that the criteria for involuntary
3 admission are dangerousness to self, others or grave
4 disability.

5 I wonder about your thoughts that an
6 involuntarily admitted police officer subject to an a
7 Physician's Emergency Certificate can then be discharged
8 from the hospital and have access to weapons when he or
9 she had chosen to voluntarily admit they would come out
10 with a prohibition for access to weapons.

11 CHIEF REED: I don't know that it's wise to say
12 anything about this.

13 DR. SCHWARTZ: Because this was an act of the
14 Connecticut State Legislature, that needs to be said.

15 CHIEF REED: They obviously knew exactly what
16 they were doing and the reason to do it. Because as you
17 say that, I think some of the other things that often
18 bother me that the officer can be back on patrol and
19 allowed to have their weapon and may be highly medicated
20 and there's no requirement unless your agency has a
21 specific requirement that says anytime you're on any
22 medications other than aspirin or cold medication, you
23 need to notify the department of that. Because I'm sure
24 there are officers that come out and work the road and
25 are medicated on pain medications, psyche medications and

1 we never know about it.

2 So I'm thinking well this is just one -- the
3 tip of the iceberg of things that I wish as a law
4 enforcement administrator I would get automatic
5 notification of. But does there seem to be some sort of
6 inequity there? It doesn't seem as though both
7 situations are being treated the same. Clearly they are
8 not being treated the same. Is that troubling? I would
9 to have say that that's troubling, but I don't know my
10 implications of that comment quite frankly.

11 MR. DUCIBELLA: This is not for you gentlemen.
12 Wayne brought up something and it's so terribly obvious I
13 feel terrible not having brought it up myself. I've been
14 in the Town of Bethany which is obviously a Troop I state
15 trooper response. There's a lot of press that's come in
16 about scrutinizing what's been done, and I think
17 hopefully to a large extent what you gentlemen have
18 produced will put a great deal of credibility on what was
19 done as opposed to the press, which often doesn't have
20 all the information and the same time limits of detail.
21 I wonder, for the benefit of the commission, I wonder if
22 this had been one of the towns, that as Wayne has
23 brought, where we don't have the same extent of police
24 presence that Newtown had, if we had this at the -- at a
25 school in Bethany, Connecticut and the response time with

1 troopers coming down 91, coming down 15, attempting to
2 get mutual aid from Hamden or from Woodbridge, we'd
3 probably be looking at a response time well outside of
4 that three minutes.

5 And while we are focusing on, as we should, the
6 details in your report -- and I know some of the
7 questions have moved outside of that scope -- I look at
8 this from a very practical perspective, which is I think
9 there are probably a number of locations in the state of
10 Connecticut where we're going to have response times that
11 are significantly different than this, probably on the
12 upside. As a result of having smaller towns that don't
13 have this kind of local law enforcement and shouldn't
14 that really be a focus of discussion? Because if we see,
15 as we look at Columbine, as we look at Virginia Tech, as
16 we look at Sandy Hook, that in almost all those cases
17 most of the activity occurs within the first six to eight
18 minutes in terms of injury or fatality. If we have towns
19 in the state of Connecticut where we are going to have
20 response time in excess of that, what's the cost benefit?
21 Why aren't we looking at that in greater detail?

22 And I'm not asking this question for you,
23 gentlemen. I'm putting it out there as a comment for the
24 Commission to look at. Because finding 10, 15 or 20
25 extra seconds for Newtown is obviously important to the

1 people who were involved in that.

2 Finding five or 10 minutes in other towns in
3 Connecticut could be just a huge difference in terms of
4 our sense of public safety for our schools. And I think
5 that should be something we cons straight on. Thank you.

6 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: We've -- I think we've heard
7 a lot about interoperability, because it's kind of clear
8 that our local resources can certainly be overmatched at
9 a moment's notice based upon the 169 communities and
10 three and a half million people, we are spread pretty far
11 and wide at times.

12 Hamden and New Haven, if you add up their
13 geography, we are slightly smaller than the Town of
14 Newtown. At any given moment between Yale University PD,
15 Hamden PD, New Haven PD, Southern Connecticut State
16 University PD, we could call out to 600 police badges at
17 any given moment in this area of about 53 square miles
18 and we still provide mutual assistance on a weekly basis.

19 So I have a really a very simple question I
20 hope. At any given moment in any area, urban, suburban,
21 rural, you may be partnered, as a law enforcement
22 officer, with someone from somewhere else. These
23 standards and protocols for that type of building access
24 as occurred at Sandy Hook Elementary School, is that
25 designed locally or is that designed by post? How do you

1 gain some level of confidence that these officers
2 tactically from different forces can penetrate the
3 building in a most effective fashion?

4 CHIEF REED: The training doctrine since
5 Columbine has been streamlined, it is now so uniformed
6 that as chiefs, and we saw it in an incident we had in
7 South Windsor, and certainly Manchester saw it even more
8 so in what happened at Hartford Distributors, was that
9 the officers that showed up, regardless of the uniform
10 they wore or the patch on their shoulder, they knew what
11 the goal was. They knew that they were not going to
12 hunker down outside and await more advanced trained
13 officers to show up. They knew that they needed to take
14 the patrol rifle out of their trunk or out of the front
15 of their car, meet up with another officer and start
16 heading into that facility.

17 We saw that happen very clearly, whether it was
18 a state trooper, whether it was a South Windsor officer,
19 an Enfield officer, a Manchester officer, an East
20 Hartford officer, the incident that happened in
21 Manchester showed that across the board the training was
22 the same and the objective was shared. So nobody
23 questioned what they were supposed to do when they showed
24 up.

25 And we as police chiefs are comfortable that

1 across the state that has been what the training doctrine
2 has been for at least a decade and we are comfortable
3 that our officers are all being trained that way. We are
4 now starting to split hairs and to look at some more
5 advanced training doctrines, which is where we send
6 officers in who are prepared to provide this medical aid,
7 not just to victims, but to each other in the event an
8 officer is injured. We are seeing a trend towards going
9 in the building with fewer officers as opposed to wait
10 for a third officer, going in there by yourself or with a
11 second officer so you can move towards the threat
12 quicker.

13 So the basic premise of everybody getting there
14 and getting into the building as quickly as possible is
15 uniformly understood.

16 Now we're starting to see some differences of
17 opinion as to whether you go in with one officer, two
18 officers or three officers. All of which are good.
19 Because it shows law enforcement's willingness to get in
20 there and confront the threat.

21 So we believe that those standards exist and
22 are being met. Could they be formalized in some fashion
23 through post? I think perhaps there's always some room
24 for solidification and uniformity when it comes to
25 policies and procedures. But I think the training

1 doctrine is very similar and everybody has the same
2 objective when they show up at an incident like that.

3 Chief Montminy, would you like to comment?

4 CHIEF MONTMINY: Yeah. Your point is well
5 taken that the police response in, let's say, Bozrah will
6 be different than East Hartford. It is important that
7 everybody maintain the same training standards. And by
8 and large we have done that on our own, but there are
9 other states in which it's simply policy. I will point
10 out Texas, for example, they are well known for this,
11 every single peace officer, not just police officer, but
12 every single peace officer in the state of Texas goes
13 through exactly the same training.

14 That means DEP officers, boat patrol officers,
15 whatever they might happen to be. Every peace officer in
16 the state of Texas goes through exactly the same
17 training. Not a bad concept. Although I think we've
18 done it, I think every chief in Connecticut understands
19 the requirement to confront an active shooter. It is not
20 statewide policy, so to speak. I think that's to your
21 point.

22 MR. SANDFORD: A follow-up question on that is
23 the authority of the officers to act. If South Windsor
24 calls Manchester to respond, does that police officer
25 from Manchester have that authority to act when they

1 respond within South Windsor, or is that something that
2 we need to look at here; that I know that you're sworn to
3 a particular town, not necessarily, you know, to the
4 state of Connecticut to respond. Is that an issue?

5 CHIEF REED: It's an issue. I will tell you
6 under mutual aid, under the statute, once the call is
7 made to engage in a mutual aid call-out, that the officer
8 is authorized to take the action that they need to take.
9 But unfortunately it is -- it becomes a gray area in the
10 minds of some CEOs and some chiefs and some police
11 officers. Year after year the Connecticut Police Chief's
12 Association has gone to the legislature looking for
13 statewide authority, so once you are a sworn police
14 officer, you're not just sworn in the community listed on
15 your patch or on your badge, But in the state of
16 Connecticut. So in the event you are called on, whether
17 it's to effect an arrest as a result of a domestic
18 dispute or to respond to a neighboring community because
19 of a critical incident, you have your full authority as a
20 police officer. And sadly right now in the state of
21 Connecticut you have that authority, but only in very
22 limited circumstances.

23 So is it an issue and would it be a wonderful
24 recommendation for this committee to move forward and say
25 police officers once they are sworn police officers

1 certified by post, they are police officers in the state
2 of Connecticut and they are authorized to perform their
3 job if needed throughout the state of Connecticut.

4 Now that has with it associated a lot of other
5 issues, but it would be nice if there was never -- if we
6 didn't to have ask that question. Chief, can I do what
7 I'm doing here? Can I enforce a misdemeanor, an
8 infraction, a violation, a felony? Where is that line
9 drawn? Right now it's felony. But if I'm in a
10 neighboring community and a crime is committed in my
11 presence and it's not a felony, my hands are tied. Even
12 if it's an act of domestic violence. And it's very
13 frustrating.

14 We've argued that before the legislature year
15 after year but unfortunately we have not moved forward in
16 getting that authority granted to us.

17 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Chiefs, we have spent a lot
18 of time going over the law enforcement response, and as
19 has been said many, many times around this table, it's
20 certainly not in an effort to be critical. We have deep
21 appreciation for the work that the men and women of the
22 law enforcement service provided on this day, and one of
23 the things I think that we will certainly need to do is
24 keep an eye on them. Because we remember the children,
25 we remember the teachers. There are a lot of other

1 people, as you mentioned, Chief Montminy, including the
2 dispatchers, who when we talk about the long-term
3 response we'll need to keep in mind. So I thank you for
4 your testimony. I thank you for your report and I thank
5 you for your time. Thank you.

6 Why don't we take a 10 minute recess,
7 reconvene at 12:10.

8 (Recess from 11:59 a.m. to 12:10
9 p.m.)

10 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: It's 12:10, so why don't we
11 reconvene. We will leave some time open for discussion
12 amongst the commission on items incorporated in both the
13 state's attorney's record around the Police Chief's
14 Association report to the extent that certain items were
15 not discussed in our first session this morning.

16 I would also like to start to lay out a
17 framework of a way that we can produce at least a
18 semifinal document with the aggressive date of mid March,
19 2014. What I think that will require is a very clear
20 understanding between now and the end of December as to
21 what topics are required by the commission to be
22 discussed and the testimony format as we saw today, what
23 items may be suitable for written testimony or other
24 types of written documentation for consideration, review
25 and analysis and then move forward to scheduling those

1 items as required.

2 We're going to have to meet pretty frequently I
3 think to make those timelines. So what I would like to
4 propose is starting with the first Friday in January, to
5 the extent that you can, have yourself available for
6 either testimony, meetings or small group writing
7 meetings based upon the subject there is.

8 And I would like to -- I would like to just
9 sort of open it up, I think Attorney Sedensky's report
10 really gave us a lot of clarity on certain items,
11 specifically the design of the school and the actual
12 layout of the school. I know that Mr. Ducibella and
13 Mr. Chivinski took very clear note of some of those items
14 and offered clear information and timeline. One thing,
15 however, that remains unclear I think to many of us is
16 this sort of fundamental question who is Adam Lanza? I
17 know that Dr. Schwartz put out a very well received
18 national piece on that question. And I'm working on a
19 couple of ways hopefully to get some additional documents
20 that were not available to the report due to the mental
21 health privilege that could not be incorporated in
22 Attorney Sedensky's report. I'm hopeful we can find a
23 way to access some of those documents and answer that
24 question with a little bit more clarity as well.

25 So with that, I would like to first open it up

1 with any questions or thoughts on Attorney Sedensky's
2 report.

3 I should say that Attorney Sedensky would like
4 report to stand on it's own. This is the document now.
5 He is also very willing and has personally provided a lot
6 of time to me in answering any specific questions that we
7 may have about the source of information or anything else
8 along those lines.

9 So I would like to open up first to any
10 discussion or questions or comments about Attorney
11 Sedensky's report. Dr. Schwartz?

12 DR. SCHWARTZ: Well I would like to follow-up
13 on the views that I expressed in the "Huffington Post"
14 article which I circulated around.

15 I am distressed at the amount of information
16 about the mental health issues that is not present in
17 Mr. Sedensky's report. And there are very -- I have
18 various levels of issue with the report. I understand
19 that some information is confidential. We have
20 confidentiality laws so that if somebody saw a mental
21 health professional and there's a record of that, that
22 information is not routinely available. However, this is
23 not a routine situation.

24 In matters that come to trial, for instance,
25 there are a variety of ways in which confidentiality is

1 contested, in which court may rule that certain
2 information should be available. There's a standard
3 nationally. And Scott, you and I have discussed this
4 briefly, in general, the confidential medical information
5 and other confidential information of deceased is held to
6 be within the estate of the deceased, and the executor of
7 the estate has the authority to release it in the absence
8 of a formally designated executor. The executor -- in
9 the absence of a spouse, the executor would be the
10 parent, and so if a parent is willing to release that
11 information, you know, it can be released.

12 You had mentioned that there is no estate in
13 this instance. I'm not sure about the legalities of
14 that. The estate is generally an ambiguous term, as I
15 understand it, just reflects that the executor who is the
16 parent in this case can have the authority. The estate
17 may consist of nothing more than the few possessions left
18 in a room or one's medical records, but that a parent
19 would still have authority with regard to it.

20 So I would like to see us -- I appreciate you
21 making efforts to get more -- some of these documents,
22 but I would like to know that we're making a full court
23 press. It would seem to me that the governor's office --
24 that the governor himself having established this
25 commission would have an interest in our having as much

1 information about Adam Lanza's mental state as we
2 possibly can review. And that having an interest in it,
3 that we should have the assistance of legal counsel to
4 know that we have pursued every avenue we possibly can
5 pursue to obtain any information that may be currently
6 withheld from us on the grounds of confidentiality. I'm
7 going to get into it in a moment what some of that kind
8 of information, you know, might be.

9 But at another level, Mr. Sedensky's report
10 suggests findings that we are not -- that are not being
11 shared in that report that I'm not sure necessarily fall
12 within the confines of confidentiality. An example would
13 be the report mentions this school project that Adam
14 Lanza did apparently in the fifth grade with a friend
15 from the school. You probably remember mention of this.
16 It was not completely present in the appendix, but a
17 summary of it was in the appendix. This was the grandma
18 something, I don't remember exactly the terminology for
19 it, but --

20 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Tales of Granny.

21 DR. SCHWARTZ: Tales of Granny, in which
22 grandmother participates of acts of horrific violence,
23 along with a grandson, I guess presumably an Adam Lanza
24 stand in. That particular document is remarkable. A, we
25 get only a kind of summary of it rather than get to see

1 it in the report. And I don't know that I necessarily
2 would glean anything more from seeing the whole document
3 than I would from seeing that summary.

4 But I don't know that I have any reason to
5 believe that Mr. Sedensky, or whoever redacted that
6 particular document, is a better judge than I am, or that
7 we are as a commission, of what information of value
8 might have been in that. That's one just on this one
9 particular item.

10 The report goes on to say that apparently this
11 school project was never handed in. Okay, so we're left
12 to presume that this document may have been found in his
13 room, but we're not told that. We don't know the history
14 of the document between the time that it was written
15 until the time that somehow investigators came upon it.
16 Why is that important? Well I would like to know if any
17 other adult ever saw that document. If not people in the
18 school, well then who? If an adult saw it, could
19 anybody -- does that reflect some missed opportunity that
20 we might have thoughts about. I would like to know that.

21 So a school essay written in the fifth grade is
22 not a confidential document by any means, any law that I
23 know about. Why don't we know more about that?

24 We're told of Mr. Lanza's many -- or at least
25 several assessments along the way. We're not told what

1 an assessment was, what kind of mental health
2 professionals made these assessments. True, the
3 assessment itself might be confidential, but I would like
4 to know was it made by a psychiatrist, a psychologist, a
5 psychiatric social worker, a mental health technician,
6 what -- I would like to know everything that can be told.
7 If there were boundaries of confidentiality that prevents
8 certain information from being in that report, I would
9 like to have that delineated.

10 Sorry, I lost my train of thought on this. I
11 have so many things that I feel so deeply about what we
12 have not been told.

13 I have to say that if we are about to start a
14 writing project here with regard to the mental health
15 issues, I don't know what we're going to write about. I
16 don't think we have heard anything from any of the people
17 who have testified here that stands far outside what is
18 commonly known amongst people who think about mental
19 health issues and might be thinking about a possible
20 relationship, or non-relationship of mental health to
21 violence.

22 I don't think in our deliberations -- you know
23 I think we as a group, we know some of the directions
24 that we would go in if we started writing a report, not
25 necessarily all. But I don't know that any of them are

1 really going to elucidate the subject matter terribly
2 far. And I do know that for us to write a report on the
3 basis of the information that we have now, to me feels
4 almost embarrassing and sets us up for potential actual
5 real embarrassment if real information that we don't have
6 becomes available at a later date.

7 Perhaps I should stop here. I know I have more
8 to say about it and I will be back, but --

9 MS. FLAHERTY: I know Hank shared his article
10 that he wrote with the Huffington -- on the "Huffington
11 Post National" and I shared with this whole panel
12 something that I wrote, but I would just like to have the
13 opportunity to read it into the record if I could.

14 Because our panel was tasked by the governor to
15 review current policy and make specific recommendations
16 in the area of public safety with particular attention
17 paid to school safety, mental health and gun violation
18 prevention. There are other bodies in other realms in
19 other states and in Washington, D.C. who are crafting
20 policies and proposing laws in many of these same areas.
21 Many of these are claiming to be in the name of helping
22 families in mental health crisis in the wake of tragedies
23 in Newtown and around the country. I just hope that as
24 we continue our work we remember that 28 people died on
25 December 14th 2012. Yes, I said 28.

1 Too often we only refer to the 26 students and
2 teachers who were killed at Sandy Hook Elementary School.
3 But 28 people lost their lives that day. One of those
4 people were the cause of the horror. One of those people
5 was the mother of that person. Their lives have no less
6 meaning. When those of us in the mental health advocacy
7 community talk about nothing about us without us, we talk
8 about the need to include people with lived experience in
9 the room when policies are being made. When we continue
10 to ignore the deaths of two people on December 14th,
11 2012, I believe that we are ignoring their lived
12 experiences, too.

13 We will never know what drove the actions that
14 took place on December 14th. We can really talk forever
15 about what happened and what led up to that day. Clearly
16 there were choices made in the years and even days prior
17 to that day that many of us would not have made, but
18 there was clearly also a struggle going on of a depth
19 that we cannot possibly hope to understand. Because the
20 two people involved are no longer here to answer
21 questions about it, we will never know the answer.

22 It is easier to make policies than infringe on
23 people's rights when you leave them out of the
24 conversation. I am very pleased that to date this
25 commission has included people with lived experience in

1 our conversation. As we continue our work, let us not
2 forget all of the lives that were lost on December 14th,
3 2012.

4 If we are truly to accomplish our mission of
5 helping to craft meaningful legislative and policy
6 changes and that our mental health system can reach those
7 that need it's help, let us not forget that Nancy Lanza
8 was a mother who was raising a son who once attended
9 Sandy Hook Elementary School.

10 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Working around the table.
11 Dr. Schonfeld, Mr. Liddy.

12 DR. SCHONFELD: I'm asking more of a question
13 to the group. I think there are different directions we
14 could take with the task of this group as to how much we
15 wish to try and reflect on the specifics of one event
16 that occurred and how much we're trying to give some
17 general information that may in general direction to try
18 and minimize other events that may be related similar or
19 even quite different. So I'm in full support of trying
20 to get the additional materials so that we can better
21 understand the specifics of this event, but I would
22 encourage us to start what I think should be a very
23 thoughtful and deliberate process of coming up with some
24 general recommendations. And I'm concerned if we delay
25 that process any further that we probably will then rush

1 the report writing with the more general recommendations
2 because we're focused more narrowly on the specifics. So
3 I would encourage us to do them in parallel so that both
4 gets the reasonable deliberation that they deserve.

5 MR. LIDDY: So thank you for the opportunity to
6 comment on this. And I think we need to refocus a little
7 bit and we need to know truly what's happening with
8 regards to all the different reports going on with
9 regards to Sandy Hook. And one thing I want to highlight
10 to this commission is that in the executive summary of
11 the state's attorney's report, the first line, the
12 purpose of this report is to identify the person or
13 persons criminally responsible for the 27 homicides that
14 occurred in Newtown, Connecticut, etc. That's really all
15 we can take away from that report. The state's attorney
16 drafted or wrote a report, authored a report that
17 basically told us there basically is nobody currently
18 alive today that we can hold accountable and prosecute
19 for this situation.

20 Now we don't have subpoena power. This
21 commission doesn't have investigatory authority, but
22 there are a number of reports that are being crafted and
23 developed around the state, whether it be through the
24 child advocates office, which has significant authority
25 who may be payable to augment what we see in this report.

1 We heard from the Chiefs of Police Association this
2 morning with their report. I think there's a lot of work
3 happening, and we're kind of in a holding pattern because
4 we don't have the authority that many of these other
5 boards and commissions do.

6 So I think we need to really refocus on what
7 our function is and how we can best come up with a
8 product that's meaningful. Like Dr. Schonfeld said,
9 having this kind of parallel process of what general
10 recommendations can we make that are meaningful, but also
11 maybe slowing the process down in terms of what
12 information do we know and that we're about to learn
13 through the state's attorney, through the child
14 advocate's office and be more thoughtful about how we
15 collect that information as opposed to doing our own
16 internal investigation. We don't have that authority.
17 We don't have that power.

18 So I just think we have to be much more
19 strategic and we have to kind of reset our pace in terms
20 of what it is we need to do, why we're doing it, what our
21 charge is. And use the information that these other
22 boards and commissions are producing, maybe sift through
23 those, see what themes that we're coming across. Because
24 to Hank's point, I don't know that we will get certain
25 information, this board or this commission. I know you

1 said you're working on that, but we can't count on that.
2 That's not our charge. That's not -- We'll be waiting
3 here for 10 years.

4 So I think we need to collaborate with other
5 boards and commissions, figure out what they're doing,
6 figure out what information we can extrapolate from those
7 reports and then move forward.

8 DR. SCHWARTZ: Well, I agree I think in part
9 with everything that has been said. And I agree that we
10 will -- we'll never know ultimately the why question.
11 The why question is, you know, is absolutely unknowable.
12 Probably unknowable even if Adam Lanza were alive and
13 could speak with us.

14 However, I do believe that every incremental
15 piece of information is important. And it may not be
16 important because it ultimately will lead us to
17 understand terribly much better how this happened, but
18 every incremental piece of information about every such
19 incident may help us in ways that we simply can't know
20 now to piece together a better understanding -- I don't
21 want to use the word mental illness here, but even just a
22 better understanding of mental state, the emotional and
23 cognitive drivers that influence people to engage in this
24 kind of behavior.

25 I think to the degree to which we can make

1 inferences about that, that should be an objective of
2 this commission. And that in order to do it, we would
3 benefit from more information.

4 Waiting for the other reports to be issued
5 again reflects the fact that we somehow are not entitled
6 to the raw information that is going into these other
7 reports.

8 And except for the fact that we don't have --
9 that we don't have subpoena authority, I'm not sure why
10 we are disadvantaged having to wait for other people to
11 process information, pieces of information that they have
12 at hand and why can't we process them.

13 I want to go to another example from
14 Mr. Sedensky's report. And to those of you who have
15 medical backgrounds, you know, on this commission, you
16 know I'm talking about something that's not likely, but
17 still something we ought to know. Mr. Sedensky's report
18 tells us that Adam Lanza had an epileptic condition at
19 some time in his life. Well there is one epileptic
20 condition, temporal lobe epilepsy, which does -- if I'll
21 use the term broadly, erode personality over time
22 sometimes in violent directions and is associated with
23 violent outbursts, usually impulsive outbursts. I don't
24 wish to tar the world of people who have this unfortunate
25 condition of temporal lobe epilepsy. There is not to my

1 knowledge a single instance of a mass shooter who has had
2 temporal lobe epilepsy, but we ought to know he had an
3 epileptic condition. Why couldn't Mr. Sedensky tell us
4 that? Was that confidential medical information? If it
5 was confidential medical information, why was it any less
6 confidential that he had his -- the form of epilepsy he
7 had was this particular form or not? We ought to at
8 least know.

9 Maybe Mr. Sedensky doesn't know, but fine, then
10 we should at least be informed that the record doesn't
11 indicate what kind of epilepsy he may have had.

12 And again, I want to say that the chances that
13 the type of epilepsy is actually relevant are tiny to
14 minuscule, but I'm unwilling to give away even minuscule
15 incremental pieces of information that we could have if
16 it were offered to us and could help us, you know, to
17 understand.

18 DR. FORRESTER: Thank you. I agree very much
19 with what the folks were saying. And Kathy, thank you
20 for your piece on reminding us how many people were
21 involved. I think there's been a lot of discussion and
22 important discussion around the mental state of Adam
23 Lanza; but for me, in reflecting just the testimony we
24 had, when we had a timeline, very articulate second by
25 second timeline of what -- a very complex event happened,

1 you know, within those minutes of the shooting. And
2 frankly, we have no timeline, no articulation of this
3 person's life from a developmental perspective. We have
4 had testimony from folks from NAMI and parents who have
5 talked about how difficult it is to raise children with
6 complex health issues, mental health issues, but we have
7 had no articulation of the developmental trajectory of
8 this young man's life.

9 And all we can do currently is to guess the
10 systemic problems that might have occurred with the
11 complex issues as indicated a little bit in the report.
12 And I think our question is what our job is? And it
13 seems to me that job is we've been asking systemic
14 questions all along. We are talking to the state police.
15 Are you communicating well with each other? How do towns
16 communicate with each other? And yet we really have very
17 little information on the history and developmental story
18 both of him and his parent.

19 There are going to be idiosyncratic things of
20 course, very specific to this family, very specific to
21 this mother and her choices, that we may be able to get
22 into or not. But, you know, we need to understand what
23 happened from birth, if we can, through age 20 where this
24 young man spent three months texting his mom and not in
25 an engaged place.

1 So I don't know what report, and I don't -- and
2 maybe you know differently if there is going to be one
3 that will articulate a developmental timeline
4 systemically. I assume that any reports we get would
5 give us indications of what some of the stories were, you
6 know, throughout his life. But I feel like we can only
7 make very broad assumptions right now with the
8 information, or the lack of information we have. And you
9 know, we need to make some efforts to be able to, even if
10 it's a broad 20 year timeline, really articulate like we
11 had those minutes articulated.

12 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Since I'm in line, I'm going
13 to jump in the cue.

14 If the trial advocate surrogate has been as
15 generous with her time as Attorney Sedensky in going over
16 what they have, how they've obtained it and what the
17 expectations are, it's her expectation that some time in
18 mid January she will have a better idea of the issuance
19 of the report perhaps. So we are going to stay in touch
20 on that.

21 In some ways I feel like the 28th person in
22 this is Nancy Lanza. So when I look at this issue, I
23 look at it through the prism of my son. Max is -- he
24 will be eight. If max covered his windows with trash
25 bags, what would I do? If he demanded within the same

1 household to communicate only by e-mail, what would I do?
2 So I think it is perhaps at our peril that we hyper focus
3 on the mental state of the shooter. Because the one
4 person that we can guarantee he had some access to, some
5 communication with, from the information available to us,
6 did not take specific action related to him. So who's
7 our audience? I think part of our audience is the
8 parents. The parent of those children. How should you
9 respond? We may not have a specific diagnosis for the
10 shooter, but we certainly have enough information to look
11 at some behavioral choices made within the household.
12 And I think part of what we need to do is we need to
13 encourage the parents not to take that road.

14 What do we know? To my reading of Attorney
15 Sedensky's report, the most concise description of
16 Mr. Lanza is on page 35. In 2006 the shooter had an
17 overall IQ in the average range. He had no learning
18 disability. Depending on the psychological test
19 statement, he could be average, below average or above
20 average. Testing that required the touching of objects
21 could not be done. He was reported that his school
22 issues related to his identified emotional and or
23 pervasive developmental disorder, Spectrum disorders.
24 His high level of anxiety, Asperger's characteristics,
25 obsessive-compulsive disorder, concerns, and sensory

1 issues all impacted his performance to a significant
2 degree limiting his participation in a general education
3 curriculum. Tutoring, desensitization and medication
4 were recommended. It was suggested that he would benefit
5 by continuing to be eased into more regular classroom
6 time and increasing exposure to routine events at school.
7 The shooter refused to take suggested medication and did
8 not engage in suggested behavior therapies.

9 To my reading, that is the most cohesive and
10 concise item. Now the details of that are to be
11 determined. The details are to be determined.

12 But there are going to be a multiplicity of
13 reports, as Mr. Liddy mentioned. One of the things we
14 talked about many months ago before we went on a hiatus
15 was that the fact we do not need to necessarily recreate
16 items. Dr. Schwartz served on a panel nearly 15 years
17 ago to come up with a series of recommendations, never of
18 which were ever enacted. Dr. Schonfeld put this in my
19 hand. It's a very valuable document. We do not need to
20 re-write this document, but we do need to highlight it,
21 it's power and it's lasting power.

22 So when I think of what we can accomplish --
23 and let's talk about what we can accomplish in a very
24 concrete way. Mr. Ducibella, one of the nation's experts
25 in this field, has some very clear thoughts on school

1 safety design that have been in some ways captured by the
2 images and descriptions identified in Attorney Sedensky's
3 report. That is something that we can very coherently
4 take some pretty good steps on pretty quickly.

5 Yes, the mental health is going to be a
6 challenge and we knew that from the outset. We knew that
7 from the outset. It's going to take a lot of grappling
8 to figure out thematically how to organize a topic of
9 this size and scope. However, that is our charge.

10 Thanks.

11 MS. EDELSTEIN: One of the things that struck
12 me this morning in the presentations was the need for
13 resources, whether we're talking about local police
14 departments, whether we're talking about state police. I
15 think if we were to invite any of our previous panels
16 back, we would hear again about the resource needs in the
17 mental health community, in the school districts. A
18 myriad of places. I think that we should be focusing on
19 the broad themes. We can't handle what happened in the
20 past. We can't change what happened in the past. What
21 we can do is move forward with solid recommendations
22 about changes that can be made perhaps incrementally
23 throughout systems in Connecticut. If there are resource
24 recommendations, we can recommend them. Not necessarily
25 with dollar amounts. If there's support needs that are

1 identified, we could recommend those in all fields. But
2 that's really the direction that I would suggest that we
3 go. I think we produced a report that could be a leading
4 report to design a future plan rather than looking
5 retroactively into situations that are really beyond our
6 scope and grasp and ability to influence.

7 MS. KEAVNEY-MARUCA: I keep coming back to the
8 beginning of Dr. Schwartz's comments that were
9 publicized. And that is about countries who had done
10 something about proliferation of guns and have done
11 something serious about gun control. And I keep thinking
12 that Adam Lanza's mental health is what it is. It is
13 what it was. If he didn't have access to guns, we
14 wouldn't be sitting here today. And so I know that that
15 battle was lost in spite of the president's best efforts
16 back in the spring, but I think that should be a major
17 part of this recommendation. I don't think we should
18 give up that battle at all.

19 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Thank you.

20 DR. BENTMAN: Our -- Our decision to -- Your
21 decision to sort of reconvene this with Mr. Sedensky's
22 report lead me to go back to read -- I picked the
23 Virginia Tech report. I was I guess professionally more
24 interested in the mental health piece of that, but kind
25 of scanned the report in general. I will say now what I

1 said once before, as that both the Columbine and the
2 Virginia Tech commissions reports are really, they are
3 eulogies to those who were lost and they bring alive the
4 circumstances of the event that charged -- that led to
5 the charge of the commission and they linked them to the
6 future and the recommendation. So I don't -- I would
7 recommend that this commission use those two reports,
8 especially the Virginia Tech report, as a model for
9 what's possible for a commission such as ours to achieve.

10 This group -- This was -- I mean I've been
11 impressed with the kinds of questions that were asked.
12 But this was a laser focus today, very specific, very
13 practical. And I think it was that way because it -- we
14 were addressing Mr. Sedensky's report and the police
15 chiefs' report of the actual event. So I think that that
16 linkage is critical to the work that we do.

17 I agree with those folks who have talked about
18 mental health. I was about to sort of, if you hadn't,
19 Alice, I was going to talk about the fact that we need
20 Adam Lanza's story. We need the context in which all of
21 this happened. Because we can give him all of the kinds
22 of diagnoses we want, which are really useful, but we
23 need his story.

24 This report is not a story. It's a -- When it
25 comes to mental health and the story of a young man, it's

1 like someone threw out pieces of a puzzle and said well,
2 you know, well here's the bunch that kind of look like
3 the barn, and here's the bunch that kind of look like the
4 sky. And you can't -- there's no human being here. And
5 what Virginia Tech -- what that commission report did is
6 it created -- you had a sense of a living human being
7 from the age of three through the time of his death and
8 of the experience of his family. And they used --
9 whoever did the interviews of these individuals, they
10 listened with the mind of a mental health professional.
11 They were not -- they -- or this information was culled.

12 So, for example, you report -- you read from
13 Mr. Sedensky's report. You may not know, but my ear
14 tells me that's a PPT report. That's a summation of
15 neuro -- of some kind of testing, either well done or not
16 so well done, that is summarized. And I can tell you
17 that that report is how many pages would you say, nine?

18 MS. KEAVNEY-MARUCA: Yeah.

19 DR. BENTMAN: In that report, only part of it
20 is about his education. It also captures a feel for who
21 the parents were sitting in the room, or whether they
22 didn't show up at all, and a feel for the relationship
23 the parents with the teachers. And I bet there are a
24 boat load of those reports out there that we need. The
25 people with an eye toward being able to interpret the

1 material have to read that. I can't tell who interviewed
2 anybody here in relation to mental health. I can't tell
3 who reviewed the professional reports. I can't tell
4 whether they were a well trained forensic police unit, or
5 the FBI unit, or whether it was somebody sort of a random
6 person in a police office. So we need some level of
7 expertise that's brought to bear to this. But I would
8 encourage us to link the event to our recommendations.

9 DR. SCHWARTZ: I'm in the peculiar position of
10 having every bit of information I need in order to make
11 some salient recommendations on school design. So I'm
12 listening with anything other than a deaf ear to those
13 medical professioners in the room. And I want to refer
14 back to a very, very brief statement made by Mr. Liddy
15 and -- because I come from a family of law enforcement
16 and routinely work with law enforcement and EMS.

17 This is a report by the Division of Criminal
18 Justice. They have the sole responsibility to identify
19 if there's anyone to prosecute or not. They have not
20 delved into the areas that you are so in need of
21 nourishment and hunger for in order for you to approach
22 the mental health proponents of what you think
23 recommendations would be.

24 So previous reports, and I went back to
25 Virginia Tech and I went back to Columbine. In fact you

1 may remember that we had an individual who testified for
2 us very early on who said that what they really were
3 attempting to do in Columbine was to look at the law
4 enforcement response by addressing issues that had to do
5 with criminality and develop essentially a new strategic
6 response as to how they would (unintelligible) of that.
7 This commission seems to have a broader responsibility.

8 And so I think not to offer up an answer, but
9 to put a platform of discussion out there. For those of
10 us -- and we all mutually serve this responsibility to
11 make recommendations regarding gun control. We've heard
12 an awful lot of testimony in legislation and certainly --
13 I mean this report goes into extensive detail about how
14 to identify a round from a Bush Master rifle in three
15 different types of characterization. We have all the
16 information about the firearms, the number of rounds that
17 were fired, where the weapons were purchased, who
18 purchased the weapons. We have a wealth of information
19 to provide a very difficult series of recommendations
20 that would be difficult to impeach. What I've heard --
21 each one -- and we have similar information -- I mean I
22 have a drawing of the school. I have an indication of
23 who arrived, when they arrived, where they went, what
24 they did. How long it took to go from point A to point
25 B, where the rounds were discharged, where on the floors

1 they were found, and how many rounds and what kind of a
2 circle were found and what kind of glass. Everything you
3 aren't finding with respect to your medical practitioner
4 portion.

5 So I think there's, at least from kind of an
6 observer's perspective, there's a basic decision to be
7 made, which is with respect to gun control and with
8 respect to safe school design. The report provides an
9 extraordinary amount of detail that can be used to
10 provide a great detail of credibility into what we might
11 write. What I'm hearing from the medical health
12 practitioners in the room is you have more information
13 about the individuals than you did before, but it
14 certainly doesn't sound to be clinically provided,
15 extraordinarily detailed in its pedigree. Nor do you
16 have the fidelity of information to reach mature
17 solutions about it from what's in the document.

18 So a fundamental question is do you go out and
19 research and get a great deal of more information? I
20 don't have an opinion on that. How long would that take?
21 Where would you get it from? And if you feel as a group
22 that that is what you need to have in order for your
23 recommendations to have the same pedigree as those we
24 might make about guns and gun legislation or safe school
25 design, then I think you have a schedule conundrum to

1 meet your deadline, Commissioner -- Chair, or -- and I
2 don't like this, and I'm not certainly advocating for
3 it -- those that have a responsibility for writing about
4 the mental health piece, end up writing it from a
5 different perspective or with less pedigreed information
6 and in effect distancing yourself from the specifics of
7 the event because you don't have them, which falls back
8 upon these more general concerns. And I think as you
9 said very clearly, how do we then avoid the future
10 embarrassment of saying we had information, we drew
11 conclusions from it, but those conclusions might not have
12 had the pedigree we would have liked? Especially if this
13 report has background information which very clearly
14 provides detailed information about law enforcement,
15 emergency response, gun control and safe school design,
16 all of which I think are in here.

17 I think there's sort of a fundamental
18 discussion platform that those of you in the room who
19 feel a great allegiance to your profession and who want
20 to write legislative -- perhaps legislatively appropriate
21 recommendations, how do you go about doing that? On what
22 justification do you do it? On what background do you do
23 it and with what information do you have it?

24 There are some of us in the room who probably
25 have more here to do -- we have a lot to deal with that

1 gives us comfort, if you will, in what we write, but I
2 hear from you that you don't have it.

3 And I think there's a fundamental decision
4 moving forward about what is it that you're going to
5 write and what are you going to base it on? I don't know
6 that any of that is news. I'm just giving you that from
7 my own perspective because I have a little different
8 comfort base to work from from what I have. And thank
9 you.

10 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Go with Ms. Flaherty and
11 Dr. Forrester and --

12 MS. FLAHERTY: The thing that's been hard,
13 especially being an attorney who doesn't practice
14 criminal law and finally see in this report, is that
15 there are a lot of things that are missing.

16 And going back and remembering the Virginia
17 Tech report, but not going -- not reading it again, but
18 remembering that the parents cooperated, and they
19 interviewed the parents. And I remember seeing his
20 story, but we don't see a lot of Adam's story in this.
21 And I remember reading in the report that the brother --
22 he said that the brother and the father cooperated, but
23 then we don't see a lot of the story or what they might
24 have said or didn't say.

25 And clearly there was a lot of pain in that

1 household. I mean it's not -- I hate using the word
2 normal, it's not normal behavior for a son and a mother
3 to communicate only by e-mail when you live in the same
4 house. So clearly there was something happening that
5 wasn't right, for lack of a better word. There was a
6 communication breakdown, but it was a mom and a son who
7 were struggling. A person who was hurting. You know,
8 there was a divorce, there was trauma, there was a lot of
9 things going wrong in that house.

10 And we can -- There were a lot of choices that
11 were made for lots of things. I mean one thing that hit
12 me was she gave him a check to buy a gun for Christmas.
13 There were choices that I think folks might not have
14 made. But I think we don't need to keep doing things
15 that other people are doing. I think like you said, we
16 don't want to keep recreating wheels that other people
17 are building.

18 So if there are other people doing work -- and
19 we don't have subpoena power. For me as an attorney, if
20 we don't have the tools to get that, if we really were
21 getting cooperation from people that they had in other
22 reports, Virginia Tech where the parents were cooperating
23 and were freely sharing information. An executor of an
24 estate could share that information. And I'm assuming
25 the dad is the executor of his estate. If his executor

1 of the estate is not complying, isn't giving the
2 information, and is the only person who can waive that
3 information, I'm sorry, we don't have the ability to get
4 that information. Bottom line, it's protected. I'm
5 sorry, as much as we would like to get that information,
6 we legally don't have the ability to get it.

7 If there's another agency that does, fine. But
8 people do have legal rights even when they've passed.

9 DR. FORRESTER: Thank you. And I think the
10 last part of the statement is definitely something that
11 we have to honor and respect. But it's interesting to me
12 through this whole year in process of -- you know, our
13 conversation around gun control. And we know a lot about
14 guns and, you know, we have a lot of information around
15 the ballistic and the bullets in the room; but a part of
16 gun control is -- was exactly what happened in that
17 family around the multiple guns in the -- available in a
18 room that she was not allowed to be in. And then, you
19 know, the increased purchase.

20 So we don't have a lot of understanding around
21 the human part of choices around these, you know, gun
22 control. So, you know, to kind of put it in a mental
23 health category in some ways it's too siloed. That we
24 need to look at the dynamics around gun usage, what a
25 family, the safety -- we had some testimony on safety of

1 guns and locking them up and things like that; but we
2 really don't have any real understanding of what's the
3 dynamic of a family that likes to shoot, that that's the
4 unifying thing in the family. And then, you know, what's
5 the dynamic of a parent who has a child who is interested
6 in mass shootings and what's that dynamic related to her
7 then allowing easy access to guns. So really
8 understanding that dynamic I think is really critical.

9 It's just easier to talk about guns and gun
10 control from a distant place and to not look at the
11 people part of it. And I think we really have to
12 understand more about that. And I think, Mary, you said
13 this and it's really true, there are many parents who
14 maybe are listening to this testimony today who are
15 living in very complex situations. And they are -- we've
16 heard testimony, very desperate for help in trying to
17 understand what to do.

18 And I don't know what Nancy Lanza's thinking
19 was, and I don't know how clear it is, but I imagine she
20 was in distress at times because it must be very
21 distressing to have a child with so many special needs.
22 And we need to have an answer for them. We need to have
23 suggestions for them.

24 You know we heard testimony from the secret
25 service on threat assessment teams. University of

1 Virginia, you know, is now going into schools and has
2 training principals on how to determine what a threat is
3 and the seriousness of a threat. We need to, I think,
4 really come up with an understanding of what would be
5 sufficient for families who have these children where
6 they really don't know where it go. Because frankly,
7 there are no such thing. You can go to an individual
8 psychiatrist, you can go bring your child to get tested.
9 You rely on the school to come up with a report. That
10 boy, it says in there, the shooter refused to take the
11 meds. How old was he when he refused? Who refused?
12 That question is not clear. You're listening to that is
13 he refused. He could have been seven when that report
14 was written. And his parents refused. So we need to
15 understand what the dynamics are to allow this kind of
16 condition to happen.

17 We're never going to predict, we know that's
18 not possible. But there are parents out there who have
19 children with complex needs that we're here and I feel
20 part of our responsibility is to make recommendations for
21 setting up the system to help them.

22 DR. SCHWARTZ: First of all I have to say to
23 everybody I think this is a good discussion that we're
24 having, and one certainly that we need to have. But some
25 responses to some of the things that have been said, I

1 don't think that we know that the father has refused to
2 release some of the records or information that we don't
3 have. If he has, and he might well have. But if he has,
4 that simply could have been included in the report.

5 I know Sedensky's -- Mr. Sedensky's charge as
6 the state's attorney was to make the determination of
7 whether anybody could be prosecuted. But he says in his
8 own report that he had no obligation to issue a report
9 above and beyond that, but he chose to because of the
10 critical nature of this event.

11 So if one chooses to write a report above and
12 beyond one's minimal obligations, why write a report
13 that's only six inches wide as opposed to two yards wide
14 with information? That was I think a subjective
15 determination.

16 So we certainly could have been informed and it
17 would of -- it would have put the issue to rest that the
18 father refuses release of these reports. But we don't
19 know that. So can we invite the father to testify to us?
20 Do we know that he would refuse? I don't know. You
21 might know, Scott, but -- you know, possibly. But that
22 would be a question.

23 So hearing the many things that everybody said,
24 you know, I guess I agree, we could write a report
25 without the information that we're talking about today as

1 being missing. It just won't be the report that it could
2 have been.

3 Can we have a discussion, by the way -- and I
4 guess Scott this would fall to you -- can we have a
5 discussion or a summary of just what are actually all of
6 the reports that are being developed out there, what the
7 nature of your discussion with the people developing
8 them, for instance, child advocate has been. You know,
9 what information they do have? I mean if you can't
10 reveal the content of it, just at least the category of
11 it so that we actually have a better idea than I think we
12 have about what's there.

13 The last comment I want to make is that if we
14 do write a report in this much more general and
15 non-specific vein, I think one thing we have to
16 acknowledge, Mr. Lanza got one diagnosis that we would
17 consider to be a formal diagnosis, if you will. Saying
18 that he had obsessional qualities or traits whatever is
19 not actually a diagnosis. But we've heard from the press
20 and now in Mr. Sedensky's report that he carried the
21 diagnosis. He was given the diagnosis of Asperger's
22 syndrome, the term PDD or pervasive developmental
23 disorder is used. And Asperger's is a component, you
24 know, of -- it is a sub unit of the larger category of
25 pervasive developmental disorder which in general --

1 generally reflects the autism spectrum with one or two
2 other very minor diagnoses thrown in.

3 Now it is the fact that parents who are raising
4 kids on the pervasive developmental disorder spectrum
5 have the hardest time accessing services of just about
6 any parent or family constellation dealing with any
7 disabling or -- disorder. If you get the diagnosis of
8 your kid is depressed and suicidal, you can get more
9 services. If your kid has schizophrenia, you can get
10 more services. I'm not suggesting you can get ideal
11 services.

12 Pervasive developmental disorder falls outside
13 of the customary categories of reimbursement, for one.
14 Insurers pay for less -- these kids need care and
15 rehabilitation services of one kind or another throughout
16 their lives. And if there is a story in Mr. Sedensky's
17 report, that's -- there's a little bit of that story.
18 You hear that story through here that this was a kid with
19 pervasive developmental disorder, sub type Asperger's,
20 who clearly came to people's attention multiple times
21 throughout his life and then kind of fell off the map.

22 Well if you want to put yourself in Nancy
23 Lanza's shoes, you have a kid who's had pervasive
24 developmental disorder who's not compliant, not accepting
25 the treatment and now is a 15, 16, 17, 18 year old kid,

1 the resources are barely out there. And to try to access
2 them, we hear time and time again, wears down any and
3 every family trying to access them.

4 So talk about, you know, if there's another
5 story, is it possibly the path of least resistance of a
6 mother living as a single parent trying to cope with this
7 sort of thing.

8 So I'm raising this to suggest a couple things.
9 I do think we have to get to the subject of pervasive
10 developmental disorder in our work going forward. But if
11 there's value to knowing more of the details of the story
12 for us to have impact, it would be what does it take --
13 what did it take in these people's lives to try to get
14 help for this particular issue? And we know only the
15 barest minimum details in that regard.

16 And you know, I don't know that you have to
17 have the confidential medical reports to have information
18 that would be useful about the attempts to access care,
19 what might actually have been available, what was not
20 available that would lead us I think to be able to say
21 something powerful about this whole segment of the
22 population that is just hugely undertreated.
23 Dr. Schonfeld, you might he have some experience in this
24 area also that can support this -- what I'm saying.

25 MR. LIDDY: I just want to say I agree

1 completely with Alice and Hank on there is a story to be
2 told here and we need to give a voice to the people
3 attempting to access services. And there are two ways I
4 think we can accomplish that. One, to really drill down
5 the story of this family and help to recognize where
6 system issues, what type of access did this family have,
7 what were the challenges or barriers to accessing care.
8 And two, giving a voice to those parents who are
9 currently struggling with child or children who have some
10 of these challenges.

11 And so I guess my -- so I agree with that. My
12 challenge being a commissioner or appointed member of
13 this commission is are we the appropriate body; and are
14 we well equipped to facilitate that conversation, to get
15 that information, specifically to the Lanzas. We can
16 give a voice to the parents and to the families that are
17 currently going through these struggles. We can invite
18 them here. We can hear their voice. We can amplify
19 their voice for the state to hear, we have a problem.

20 But I do also think that the Lanza situation
21 and the Lanza family, there's something to be learned
22 there. Not to point a finger, but to really highlight
23 the struggle systemically that the state has and that
24 maybe our country has.

25 So I think we do have to ask the questions to

1 the appropriate boards and to the appropriate
2 commissions; and we have to kind of trust that they will
3 provide some answers. Maybe they won't. We don't know
4 what they're going to come up with. So I just think we
5 need to be strategic in the questions that we ask and to
6 whom we ask them.

7 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: If I could just answer that
8 directly before getting to you, Dr. Schonfeld. Yeah, the
9 answer is to ask. I wanted to have this conversation,
10 but at the end of the day, we ask. Government is by
11 authority. I've got to tell that to my department heads
12 all the time. Authority matters, but you can always ask.
13 And that's the first step, you ask nicely.

14 Dr. Schonfeld?

15 DR. SCHONFELD: You know, as I reflect on this,
16 when the group originally came together, there were three
17 areas, school security, gun safety and mental health.

18 I think at this point from what information we
19 have, which I agree is limited, we have reason to believe
20 there was a mental health problem in this particular
21 case. So we know enough to know that there was an issue
22 here. Or at least I'm strongly suspicious of that.

23 Therefore, if we are really going to give
24 mental health recommendations based on what happened, we
25 don't have sufficient information for that. So I would

1 fully agree with that. So we would have to decide as a
2 group are we going to investigate further so that we can
3 make informed recommendations of mental health -- changes
4 in mental health legislation that ought to occur based on
5 the review of this episode, then I completely agree, we
6 need more information.

7 So we either have to make a conscious decision
8 that that was a charge given to this group, but it was
9 not given with sufficient authority or resources to be
10 able to answer the question. And then maybe we have to
11 say we can't answer that.

12 That wouldn't seem gratifying to me. I suspect
13 it would not be gratifying to most people in the room.
14 But I will also add my concerns that while we are
15 continuing to investigate, I think we're losing important
16 time to be able to start to put some structure on how we
17 will complete the report and how we will ultimately make
18 recommendations in the other areas.

19 I would fully support not releasing the final
20 document until we are all comfortable that each part of
21 it is up to where we would want it to be. But I'm -- I
22 would not -- I don't understand why we wouldn't say we'll
23 get testimony in the morning on this and start looking on
24 the other parts of the report in the afternoon.

25 I just feel like I'm -- What I don't want to

1 happen, is to have a report that's generated a couple
2 weeks right before the next legislative session, a
3 year -- before that legislative session ends. Because
4 we're looking again for more recommendations and we
5 haven't put careful due deliberation into that and
6 discussion.

7 So I think that the report that we put out last
8 year felt to me like we were under a short time frame,
9 and that we didn't have the opportunity as a group to
10 deliberate the recommendations. And I understand that
11 was a preliminary report, but I would like to make sure
12 that we do -- we have more opportunity the second time.

13 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Dr. Forrester said
14 something -- at the end of these meetings, you are all so
15 eloquent that I just write quotes for sort of the last
16 part of the meeting that Dr. Forrester said, we need to
17 have an answer for them, that being the families who are
18 struggling through this on a day-to-day basis. And I
19 agree that the way that we link this project to those
20 families is by illuminating the story of who is, who was
21 Adam Lanza. So I think it's very important that we
22 proceed on that course. Understanding the limitations
23 that may exist and the opportunities for other actors to
24 provide some level of detail so that we can start to put
25 that together.

1 We need to remind folks that this is happening
2 in households. Households are struggling with this every
3 single day. And if we're going to do our best to avoid
4 further tragic episodes, we've got to try to get a handle
5 on it.

6 One of the things that I tried to do is start
7 to put things into categories about what do we need --
8 shall what other things do we need? It seems that we've
9 talked a lot about trauma support, but as an adjunct to
10 something else. Would you agree, Dr. Schonfeld? I mean
11 do we need to take some time and talk about okay, this is
12 the proper way to deal with the long-term trauma needs of
13 children, of teachers, of support staff, of responders,
14 and of a community as a whole? Do you think we need more
15 on that?

16 DR. SCHONFELD: I think if we're going to make
17 recommendations, and what ought to be done, we have not
18 collected enough information for that.

19 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I think it's -- based upon
20 the frequency, that it's a part of our conversations, I
21 think we need to do that. So why don't we work together
22 on putting that together.

23 Safe school design, we have a lot of
24 information. Mr. Ducibella, I think you've commented on
25 that before?

1 MR. DUCIBELLA: I think we have enough
2 information to overwhelm the system with recommendations.
3 That their struggle will not be to know what to do, but
4 what to down select from. I feel strongly about that. I
5 think it's more about codifying in a way that can be made
6 into great legislation as opposed to doing more research
7 or getting more testimony.

8 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: We have some items that have
9 been sort of set off to the side pending the report, one
10 is discussion of developmental disability. I think what
11 we just heard very passionately from Dr. Schwartz in
12 terms of the absolute lack of resources, I think it makes
13 it valuable to not just look at -- look at whether
14 there's a linkage in this case, but to go a step further
15 and talk about connecting folks to resources. Is there a
16 consensus on that, that we should take a look at that?

17 ALL: Yes.

18 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I have been promoting a
19 discussion of media and entertainment. Frankly, the
20 information that I saw in the state's attorney's report
21 was unremarkable in this regard, specifically as it
22 relates to video games. There's been, for many years, a
23 discussion whether of violent video games have an
24 effect -- substantiative effect -- shooting games, are
25 they providing children with sort of real world

1 opportunities. I think there may be enough sort of in
2 the written document records for me to put something
3 together on that and distribute it as information as
4 opposed to testimony. And we'll determine from that
5 whether or not we want to move forward or do anything in
6 that regard.

7 One thing that we haven't discussed much is
8 Freedom of Information Act and whether or not we should
9 recommend changes through the state's Freedom of
10 Information Act. There's been a lot of press on it over
11 the last few months in terms of releasing of the 911
12 tapes, releasing of documents and images. I -- When you
13 run for office typically you sit before an editorial
14 board. When I had an editorial board meeting, 90
15 minutes, a couple months ago, about 80 minutes of that
16 were discussions of Freedom of Information Act as it
17 pertains to this entity. Nothing to do with my other job
18 as CEO of a municipality.

19 So I would like to get your thoughts on whether
20 or not you think that this body should address Freedom of
21 Information Act?

22 MS. FLAHERTY: I'm just wondering since there
23 was a whole other commission and/or task force, or
24 whatever their official title is, whether we might be
25 able to get a report from Dan on what they did? Because

1 I just -- it seems like having us meet on FOIA when there
2 was a whole task force about FOIA might not be the best
3 use of our time.

4 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Consensus on that one? All
5 right, we will put that into the supplemental report
6 category.

7 We do have some outstanding document requests,
8 specifically as it relates to some items that are known
9 or suspected to be known from Attorney Sedensky's report,
10 including the actual -- the actual document details of
11 (unintelligible), the mental health, medical and PPT
12 records to the extent that they exist and are available.
13 And this goes back to the FOIA list about standing
14 reports that we might reference or consolidate into our
15 master report.

16 There are also some smaller logistical
17 questions that were raised today, things like were there
18 interoperability concerns with the Connecticut State
19 Police. Which I will go back through my notes and just
20 start to get yes or no or concise answers on that and
21 share them with the group as we move forward.

22 Is there anything else you would sort of add to
23 the list?

24 MS. FLAHERTY: Have the minutes been
25 transcribed yet? I know that you were looking into

1 getting a volunteer court reporter to transcribe the
2 minutes of the prior meetings?

3 MR. KLAU: Some of them have been. And I
4 believe they have been -- I can't say. It's in the
5 process. So some of the early meetings have been
6 transcribed. We have a live court reporter here today so
7 we will get this one transcribed quickly and we're in the
8 process of completing the transcription of the other
9 meetings. So we can make available on a rolling basis to
10 everyone on the commission what we have.

11 MS. FLAHERTY: Thanks.

12 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Anything else?

13 DR. BENTMAN: In addition to that list of the
14 things that we want, and this doesn't have to be a we,
15 but there were clearly many interviews with many people
16 in an effort to get to know Adam Lanza's story and the
17 story of his family. And they referred to 700 files or
18 something or other. I mean they have -- they gathered a
19 lot of information to create this very brief and
20 criminally -- the issue of criminality focused summary.

21 So there's data out there. And if it was given
22 to one of the other groups who are going to be reporting
23 on -- to us, then I don't feel that I -- and I don't feel
24 necessarily that we need more information. But I think
25 that we do need the information that Mr. Sedensky

1 gathered that will allow a qualified individual to write
2 his story. And I'm not exactly sure what that means, but
3 there are a lot of interviews.

4 DR. SCHWARTZ: So can we ask the father to
5 testify here? Has there been any discussion of that?
6 And we know that there's the state police report of the
7 voluminous state police report. Will that be public when
8 it's issued? And can you give us the summary of your
9 discussions with the folks in the agencies that are
10 producing other reports?

11 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: In answer to your first
12 question, we can ask nicely. I would want to be
13 extremely sensitive. And in point of fact, if that were
14 to happen, I think it probably should be a subset of this
15 body. A subset of skilled professionals and that arena
16 who can take as little time necessary to develop the
17 greatest benefit in terms of telling the story.

18 So I would like to discuss that off-line. The
19 police report, I'll have to inquire as to whether there
20 will be redactions, you know, that sort of thing, but I
21 will check in on that.

22 And what was the other thing you asked for,
23 Dr. Schwartz? Oh, the summary of --

24 DR. SCHWARTZ: A summary of discussions with
25 people.

1 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: Absolutely, I will push that
2 up. Okay, thank you.

3 DR. SCHONFELD: I just want to echo the
4 comments you made and go a little further. I think it
5 would be useful to explore what would be a mechanism by
6 which we can get some information from family members and
7 colleagues in the way that doesn't require them to be
8 speaking live publicly. I just think that it's very hard
9 for them to both monitor the sharing of the information
10 that they wish to be public and being honest and open in
11 trying to help understand better what's occurred. And I
12 understand that it is a public commission, and I want
13 information to be out in the public, but -- that should
14 be out of the public. But I also think there are some
15 private and confidential matters that can inform us so
16 that we can help preserve public safety and that I want
17 to have that appropriate balance. And I'm not sure
18 having testimony to this meeting is the best way to do
19 that.

20 MR. SANDFORD: How do you propose that we
21 actually craft the document? Are you going to look to
22 create different sections of the document and then have a
23 team work on that; or is someone crafting it for us that
24 we're going to then review?

25 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: We have the able assistance

1 of Attorney Klau here, but it is our report. And so what
2 I would propose is that we -- and I will take a running
3 start at it -- we proposed a thematic framework and we
4 identify those items of high priority that we want to
5 establish. We collect our thoughts in sort of a bulleted
6 format and then pass it over for transcription into a
7 narrative so that the voice remains constant. But that's
8 theoretically how I seek to do it.

9 MR. DUCIBELLA: We had an interim report. Will
10 that be -- Will what we write now, Chair, be an addendum
11 to that or will the final report be whatever we come up
12 with now, added to what we developed before and that will
13 then be the final formal report?

14 I know we've done work before. I know it's
15 gone to legislature. I don't want to ignore it, but I
16 also don't to be to be repetitive. I don't know if we
17 have an idea of how what we used before will be combined
18 with what it is we're now going to produce.

19 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: I think it's imperative to
20 review those recommendations and determine if one year
21 out those recommendations are still recommendations we
22 endorsed. We thought they were important enough 10
23 months ago, let's make sure we still think they're
24 important.

25 MR. DUCIBELLA: And my last question is are we

1 dedicated Fridays from January on? I think you said that
2 before, but my pen tends to be very short because it's a
3 pen not a pencil.

4 CHAIRMAN JACKSON: That is accurate.

5 Tentatively 10 a.m. from January 3rd forward.

6 Seeing nothing else has coming before the body,
7 I want to thank you for the time. I think we had a
8 fantastic meeting today. I think we locked in a lot of
9 detail that we did not have available to us at the last
10 meeting. And I look forward to continuing our work
11 together and reaching our end goal. Take care. Happy
12 holidays everybody.

13 (Whereby, the deposition concluded
14 at 1:27 p.m.)

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
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I hereby certify that the foregoing 138 pages are a complete and accurate transcript of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission hearing held on December 20, 2013. And that such meeting was reduced to writing under my supervision; and that the transcript is a true record of the statements made.



VIKTORIA V. STOCKMAL, RMR, CRR
Notary Public
CSR License #00251

Dated this 11th day of
January, 2014